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GEOLOGIC CO2 SEQUESTRATION:
WHO OWNS THE PORE SPACE?
/WEN , !NDERSON

I. INTRODUCTION
As scientiﬁc ﬁndings supporting global warming are increasingly embraced by
society, government ofﬁcials and carbon-producing industries face the challenge
of how to lessen greenhouse-gas emissions. The energy industry, which is often
blamed for global warming, offers an innovative potential remedy: geologic
carbon-dioxide (CO2) sequestration—“the injection of CO2 into deep . . . geologic
formations for the explicit purpose of avoiding atmospheric emission of CO2.”1
Currently, CO2 is produced and sold for use in enhanced-oil-recovery projects
(EOR). CO2 is injected into oil-bearing strata to stimulate oil and gas production,2

* Eugene Kuntz Chair in Oil, Gas & Natural Resources at the University of Oklahoma College
of Law©. This essay was prepared for the 2008 Rudolph Lecture at the University of Wyoming
College of Law, April 14, 2008, and has been updated to reﬂect the decision of the Texas Supreme
Court in #OASTAL /IL  'AS #ORP V 'ARZA %NERGY 4RUST on August 29, 2008. Professor Anderson
served as the E. George Rudolph Distinguished Visiting Chair of Law at the University of Wyoming
College of Law during the spring semester of 2008. Professor Anderson thanks Ashleigh Boggs,
second-year law student at The University of Oklahoma College of Law, for her valuable research
assistance in preparing this paper. For a related article addressing geologic carbon sequestration in
this edition, see Delissa Hayano, 'UARDING THE 6IABILITY OF #OAL  #OAL &IRED 0OWER 0LANTS ! 2OAD
-AP FOR 7YOMINGS #RADLE TO 'RAVE 2EGULATION OF 'EOLOGIC #/2 Sequestration, 9 WYO. L. REV. 139
(2009) [below]. See also Philip M. Marston & Patricia A. Moore, &ROM %/2 TO ##3 4HE %VOLVING
,EGAL AND 2EGULATORY &RAMEWORK FOR #ARBON #APTURE AND 3TORAGE, 29 ENERGY L.J. 421 (2008); Steven
Bryant, 'EOLOGIC #/2 3TORAGE#AN THE /IL AND 'AS )NDUSTRY (ELP 3AVE THE 0LANET, 54 ROCKY MTN.
MIN. L. INST. 2-1 (2008); Jerry R. Fish & Thomas R. Wood, 'EOLOGIC #ARBON 3EQUESTRATION 0ROPERTY
2IGHTS AND 2EGULATION, 54 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 3-1 (2008).
1

Elizabeth J. Wilson & Mark A. de Figueiredo, 'EOLOGIC #ARBON $IOXIDE 3EQUESTRATION !N
!NALYSIS OF 3UBSURFACE 0ROPERTY ,AW, 36 ENVTL. L. REP. 10114, 10115 (2006).
2

Id. at 10118.
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and the CO2 that is produced with oil can be reinjected.3 Incentives encourage the
use of CO2 for EOR purposes, including tax credits in Texas, but no incentives
presently exist to sequester CO2 underground.4 Nevertheless, because using CO2
for EOR is an established practice, “[i]t is very likely that initial [geologic sequestration] projects will be linked to EOR projects.”5
Geologic sequestration as a permanent waste-storage possibility involves
injecting CO2, in either gas or liquid form, into deep subterranean strata or caverns.
The technology for geologic sequestration is “already adequate and will steadily
improve,” but one of the greatest impediments to successful implementation
of sequestration is public acceptance, which will develop as the public becomes
more aware of its advantages.6 Also, federal and state governments must agree
on a CO2 sequestration regulatory policy that will encourage CO2 emitters and
entrepreneurs to undertake this expensive endeavor.7 “There are no technical or
physical barriers to [geologic sequestration]. . . . The only thing that stands in the
way of progress at the moment is policy.”8 Of course, CO2 sequestration must also
be commercially viable, and commercial viability may, in part, depend on how the
property-rights issues are resolved.
As geologic CO2 sequestration projects gain momentum, property rights and
related liability issues will be important concerns, as Texas courts have yet to sort
out ownership and liability issues pertaining to the use of subsurface pore spaces
for CO2 sequestration and other uses—regarding both directly targeted tracts and
tracts that may suffer CO2 migration.
Section II of this essay discusses the ownership of subsurface pore space in
Texas—an important inquiry to determine which property-interest holder has the
sequestration rights. Section III brieﬂy considers property-related liability issues
regarding CO2 injection and sequestration. Then, Section IV draws comparisons
and conclusions between the application of these legal principles and CO2
sequestration. Appendix 1 provides a brief discussion of the ownership of stored
CO2 and the nature of a CO2-sequestration right. Appendix 2 provides a brief
discussion of the laws of some other petroleum-producing jurisdictions.

3
THE PETROLEUM ECONOMIST, LTD., FUNDAMENTALS
TECHNOLOGY 38–39 (Tom Nicholls ed. 2007).
4

Id.

5

Wilson & de Figueiredo, supra note 1, at 10118.

6

THE PETROLEUM ECONOMIST, supra note 3, at 8–9.

7

Id.

8

Id. at 16.
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II. OWNERSHIP OF THE PORE SPACE
When CO2 is injected into the subsurface, the injector must either own
or have permission from the owner of the subterranean pore space. Under the
common-law maxim, cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et ad inferos, a feesimple owner of land owns the entire tract “from the heavens to the depths.”
Thus, a fee-simple owner owns the subterranean pore spaces. The question of
pore-space ownership arises when the fee-simple interest is severed into a mineral
estate and a surface estate. As between the surface owner and mineral owner, most
jurisdictions, including Texas, have not speciﬁcally determined the ownership of
subterranean pore spaces. Because of the lack of a deﬁnitive answer to the question
of who may grant the right to store CO2, the Interstate Oil and Gas Compact
Commission Task Force on Carbon Capture and Geologic Storage stated in a
September 2007 report: “Perhaps the most important aspect of Texas law is that
the question of pore space ownership is not clearly settled, highlighting the need
for statutory and regulatory clarity.”9
The lack of consistent Texas case law leads to the inefﬁcient, yet realistic,
conclusion that permission from both the surface owner and mineral owner
is certainly the cautious approach. Nevertheless, I submit that the most likely
“owner” of the pore space is the surface owner. I reach this conclusion based on
four general principles:
First, a property right not expressly conveyed is retained, or conversely, a
property right not expressly reserved is conveyed.10
Second, when a fee-simple owner transfers the mineral estate or transfers
the surface estate, reserving minerals, two separate or severed estates in land are
created.11
Accordingly, if Able, fee-simple owner of Blackacre, conveys the “oil, gas,
and other minerals” to Baker, Able would retain, as part of the so-called surface
estate, everything not granted by the severance deed—that is, everything but the
“mineral estate,” which in this case would be any oil, gas, and minerals subsisting
in Blackacre. Likewise, if Able conveyed Blackacre to Baker, reserving oil, gas, and
minerals, Baker would receive everything not reserved by Able—that is everything

INTERSTATE OIL AND GAS COMPACT COMM’N TASK FORCE ON CARBON CAPTURE AND GEOLOGIC
STORAGE, STORAGE OF CARBON DIOXIDE IN GEOLOGIC STRUCTURES, A LEGAL AND REGULATORY GUIDE
FOR STATES AND PROVINCES 17 (2007). The Executive Summary of the report states: “The interest of
states in the geologic storage of CO2 arises because, in addition to conservation, it is among the most
immediate and viable strategies available for mitigating the release of CO2 into the atmosphere.”
This indicates the public policy rationale for supporting CO2 geologic storage. Id. at 9.
9

10

Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co., 144 S.W.2d 878, 880 (Tex. 1940).

11

Humphreys-Mexia Co. v. Gammon, 254 S.W. 296, 299 (Tex. 1923).
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but any oil, gas, and minerals subsisting in Blackacre—i.e., the mineral estate.12
Thus, in either case, the owner of the surface estate would own the subterranean
pore space. Of course, a deed or reservation could expressly address ownership of
pore spaces, but, typically, does not.13
Third, Texas law recognizes the mineral estate as dominant over the surface
estate, a concept often overstated. In proper context, “dominant” means that the
mineral owner has the right to use as much of the airspace, surface, and subsurface
as is reasonably necessary to explore for and exploit the minerals belonging to
the mineral owner,14 subject to the limitation of the “accommodation doctrine.”
The accommodation doctrine requires the mineral owner to accommodate the
surface owner’s reasonable existing uses to the extent that the mineral owner
may reasonably be able to do so while still being able to exercise exploration and
exploitation rights.15
This third principle has a ﬂip side: the surface owner cannot unreasonably
interfere with the interests of the mineral owner.16 Under Texas law, the meaning
of “other minerals” in the granting clause of a mineral deed includes “all valuable
substances . . . whether their presence or value was known at the time of conveyance . . . .”17 Thus, any minerals present in the property may belong to the mineral
owner, and the surface owner must reasonably accommodate exploration and
exploitation.18 This broad construction of the term “minerals” implicitly means
that the mineral owner has a potentially broad right of reasonable use that the

12
Similar reasoning should apply where the severance of oil and gas rights is classiﬁed as a
proﬁt. The holder of the oil and gas rights would have the right to exploit any oil and gas but
the underlying fee owner would retain all other rights—presumably including ownership of pore
spaces.
13
The granting clause of oil and gas leases frequently conveys the right to store hydrocarbons.
See, e.g., Ryan Consol. Petroleum Corp. v. Pickens, 285 S.W.2d 201, 203 (Tex. 1955) (lessor
“granted, demised, leased and let and by these presents does grant, demise, lease (and) let unto said
lessee, with the exclusive right to prospect, . . . operate, produce, store and remove therefrom oil, gas,
casinghead gas, and all petroleum products . . .”) (emphasis added). Of course, the right to store oil,
gas, casinghead gas, and all petroleum products does not speciﬁcally address CO2 or “ownership”
of the pore space. Moreover, when leasing, a mineral-interest owner cannot confer rights that are
greater than what such owner holds.
14
Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 621 (Tex. 1971). See also Ball v. Dillard, 602
S.W.2d 521, 523 (Tex. 1980); Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Williams, 420 S.W.2d 133 (Tex. 1967)
(discussing excessive use).
15
'ETTY /IL #O 470 S.W.2d at 621–22; Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808, 810–11
(Tex. 1972).
16

Ball, 602 S.W.2d at 523.

17

Moser v. U.S. Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 102 (Tex. 1984).

18

Id. at 103 (citing 'ETTY /IL #O, 470 S.W.2d 618).
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mineral owner may afﬁrmatively protect.19 Accordingly, even though the surface
owner may own the pore spaces, the mineral owner has broad rights to penetrate
or otherwise use them in connection with mineral exploration and exploitation.
Indeed, commercial deposits of oil and gas occupy pore spaces within geologic
traps. Thus, the mineral owner may be able to enjoin CO2 sequestration that
prevents, greatly hinders, or endangers the capture of oil and gas. But does
the “dominance” of the mineral estate address “ownership” of the pore space?
Indirectly, yes.
Texas courts categorize the mineral-owner’s right as a right to use the surface,
subsurface, and airspace to capture oil and gas that is owned by the mineral owner
in fee-simple determinable.20 For example, in 'ETTY /IL #O V *ONES, the court
stated: “We now hold explicitly that the reasonably necessary limitation extends
to the superadjacent airspace as well as to the lateral surface and subsurface of
the land.”21 This holding indirectly recognizes the surface-owner’s title to the
subsurface because the court’s express reference to the subsurface is in the context
of discussing the rights of the mineral owner to use that which belongs to the
surface owner.22 However, assuming the surface owner owns the pore spaces, the
surface owner must nevertheless reasonably accommodate the mineral-owner’s
use of the pore spaces in connection with mineral exploration and exploitation
operations. Likewise, if the mineral owner owns the pore spaces, then, presumably,
the mineral owner must accommodate the surface-owner’s use of the subsurface
in connection with the surface-owner’s retained rights. Thus, in either case, the
cautious CO2 sequestration operator would secure permission from both surface
and mineral owners.
Assuming that the surface owner “owns” the pore space, the mineral-estate
owner nevertheless has the right to use the pore space to facilitate mineral
exploration and exploitation. This right of use would include the right to inject
substances, such as CO2, for purposes of enhanced oil recovery. The fact that
CO2 injection might also result in the long-term sequestration of CO2 should
not, in my opinion, alter the right of the mineral-estate owner to engage in CO2
injection for enhanced oil recovery. Thus, the mineral-owner’s right to inject
CO2 for enhanced oil recovery, including the additional goal of long-term CO2
sequestration, should fall within the mineral-owner’s right of reasonable use even
though “ownership” of pore spaces lies with the surface owner.

19

See, e.g., Emerald Coal & Coke Co. v. Equitable Gas Co., 107 A.2d 734 (Pa. 1954) (ﬁnding
that a coal company successfully enjoined subsurface gas storage that was to occur in stratum directly
beneath an active coal mine).
20

In the case of solid minerals, a full mineral interest would be owned in fee-simple absolute
and include a similar right to use the surface, subsurface, and airspace.
21

'ETTY /IL #O, 470 S.W.2d at 621 (emphasis added).

22

Id.
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That CO2 is also injected for sequestration should be no different than
injecting saltwater for EOR. When saltwater is injected, either partially or
wholly for EOR or disposal purposes, permanent sequestration of the saltwater is
contemplated, although, potentially, the saltwater could be withdrawn for use in
another EOR project. The same would hold true with CO2, but, if one purpose
of CO2 injection is to address concerns about global warming, the objective of
permanent sequestration would be a paramount concern, which would necessarily
require a robust regulatory system to assure that this objective is achieved. As with
water, however, such a regulatory system might not prohibit the later withdrawal,
use, and reinjection of CO2 for another EOR project, as long as the CO2 was
ultimately sequestered. On the other hand, the right to inject CO2 solely for
sequestration, unrelated to enhanced-oil recovery, would most likely be held by
the surface owner.
Another indication that the surface owner owns the subsurface after a mineral
severance is that the surface owner retains groundwater rights.23 In 3UN /IL #O V
7HITAKER, the Texas Supreme Court held that Sun, the oil and gas lessee, acting
under a lease from the fee-simple owner who subsequently conveyed the surface
estate to Whitaker, had the right to use groundwater to the extent reasonably
necessary to produce oil and gas.24 In other words, Sun’s right to use groundwater
implicitly recognizes surface-owner title to the groundwater. Although surfaceowner title to groundwater does not necessarily mean that the surface owner holds
title to subsurface pore spaces, the Texas groundwater cases give no hint of another
possibility.
Fourth, a regulatory agency with the power to authorize regulated activities,
such as the Texas Railroad Commission, authorizing underground gas storage
or saltwater disposal, has no authority to determine property rights.25 Thus, the
fact that a regulatory agency has issued a permit to an operator for geologic CO2
sequestration does not give that operator title to any subsurface pore spaces.
However, when considering liability, a permit may be of some relevance if CO2
migrates beyond the tract where it is injected—an issue addressed in the next
section.
Although no Texas case law finally determines the ownership of subterranean
pore spaces as between the surface and mineral owner, a handful of cases shed
23
Pﬂuger v. Clack, 897 S.W.2d 956, 959 (Tex. App. 1995), WRIT DENIED. Texas is perhaps the
only remaining state to adhere to the “absolute ownership” theory regarding groundwater. See City
of Sherman v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 643 S.W.2d 681, 686 (Tex. 1983) (“The absolute ownership
theory regarding groundwater was adopted by this Court in Houston & T.C. Ry. Co. v. East, 98
Tex. 146, 81 S.W. 279 (1904).”).
24

483 S.W.2d 808, 811 (Tex. 1972).

25

See, e.g., Ryan Consol. Petroleum Corp. v. Pickens, 285 S.W.2d 201, 207 (Tex. 1956); Pan
Am. Prod. Co. v. Hollandsworth, 294 S.W.2d 205, 211–12 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956), WRIT REFUSED
n.r.e.
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some light on the issue. The facts of an unreported case are on point; however,
the issues discussed by the appellate court are not. Nevertheless, -AKAR 0RODUCTION
Co. v. Anderson26 illustrates the ownership issue, and the trial court’s ﬁndings
and conclusions are a matter of record. In this case, at the request of the lessor’s
successor in interest to an oil and gas lease, the trial court permanently enjoined
the lessee’s successor from bringing saltwater produced from wells located on other
tracts onto the leased premises and from injecting the saltwater into subsurface
strata beneath the leased premises.27 The injunction was issued even though the
Railroad Commission had issued a permit for the saltwater disposal.28
The injunction was granted on the ground that the oil and gas lease did
not expressly authorize the lessee or its successors to use the leased premises as a
commercial waste-disposal site.29 Thus, while -AKAR implies that the fee-simple
owner could have expressly leased disposal rights, the rights are not leased by
implication. In Texas, an oil and gas lease is not a “lease,” but a conveyance
of any oil and gas in place for the duration of the lease—typically a fee simple
determinable.30 Because a lease conveys a fee simple determinable, this same
reasoning should also apply to the severance of minerals by a mineral deed or
to a reservation of minerals in a deed that conveys the surface. Thus, while a
mineral deed may expressly convey, and a reservation may expressly reserve,
underground disposal and storage rights, such rights are not conveyed or reserved
by implication. Accordingly, in a typical mineral deed, title to pore spaces is not
conveyed by implication. Likewise, in a typical reservation of minerals, title to
pore spaces is not reserved by implication.
CO2 sequestration is somewhat analogous to underground gas storage.
Somewhat surprisingly, Texas law does not ﬁnally determine whether the owner
of the surface or the owner of the mineral rights holds the right to store gas
underground. If Texas case law did answer this question, then this same case
law would likely determine which owner holds CO2 sequestration rights. Two
contrasting cases illustrate the issue. %MENY V 5NITED 3TATES, a federal Court of
Claims case applying Texas law, held in favor of surface owner’s title to storage
rights.31 In contrast, in -APCO )NC V #ARTER, a Texas appellate decision, the
mineral owners prevailed on their ownership claim.32
26

Makar Production Co. v. Anderson, No. 07-99-0050-CV, 1999 WL 1260015 (Tex. App.
1999), NO WRIT.
27

Id. at *2.

28

Id. at *1–2.

29

Id. at *2–3.

30

See Cherokee Water Co. v. Forderhause, 641 S.W.2d 522, 525 (Tex. 1982); Stephens County
v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 254 S.W. 290, 292 (Tex. 1923).
31

Emeny v. United States, 412 F.2d 1319 (Ct. Cl. 1969).

32

Mapco, Inc., v. Carter, 808 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. App. 1991), rev’d in part on other grounds, 817
S.W.2d 686 (Tex. 1991).
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In %MENY, the federal Court of Claims, applying Texas law, concluded that
the surface owners retained the gas storage rights.33 In this case, fee-simple owners
leased tracts “for the sole and only purpose of mining and operating for oil and
gas and of laying pipe lines . . . to produce, save, and take care of said products.”34
The lessees developed a stratum called the Bush Dome for natural gas. This gas
contained small amounts of helium. Due to the strategic nature of helium, the
United States acquired these leases by purchase or condemnation and later brought
in helium-gas mixtures for storage in pore spaces in the Bush Dome, where some
native gas had already been extracted.35 The court concluded as follows:
The surface of the leased lands and everything in such lands,
except the oil and gas deposits covered by the leases, were still
the property of the respective landowners. . . . This included
the geological structures beneath the surface, including any such
structure that might be suitable for the underground storage of
‘foreign’ or ‘extraneous’ gas produced elsewhere.
It necessarily follows that the 1923 oil and gas leases on the
lands containing the Bush Dome did not grant to the lessee—or
to the defendant as the present holder of gas rights under such
leases—any right to use the Bush Dome for the storage of gas
produced elsewhere.36
In (UMBLE /IL  2ElNING #O V 7EST, the Texas Supreme Court cited %MENY
for the proposition that the surface owner retained “the geological structures
beneath the surface, together with any such structure that might be suitable for
the underground storage of extraneous gas produced elsewhere.”37 However,
Professors Smith and Weaver have observed: “. . . that [this] proposition was hardly
crucial to the outcome of the case,”38 which was an action by royalty owners who
asserted rights in the stored gas on the ground that the gas was being commingled
with native gas in the reservoir.
An unreported decision of the Court of Appeals for the Third District also
supports surface-owner title to pore spaces. In &0, &ARMING ,TD V 4EXAS .ATURAL

33

%MENY, 412 F.2d at 1323.

34

Id.

35

Id. at 1323.

36

Id.

37

Humble Oil & Reﬁning Co. v. West, 508 S.W.2d 812, 815 (Tex. 1974) (citing %MENY, 412
F.2d 1319).
38
ERNEST E. SMITH & JACQUELINE LANG WEAVER, TEXAS LAW
(Matthew Bender & Co. and LexisNexis Group 2007).
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2ESOURCES #ONSERVATION #OMMISSION, the court implicitly accepted the notion
that surface owners own the pore spaces.39 The surface owners of tracts nearby
a proposed non-hazardous-waste-disposal site challenged the issuance of the
disposal permit, alleging that the agency acted beyond its authority and alleging
a taking on the ground that the evidence indicated that, within ten years, the
injected waste would likely reach the subsurface stratum beneath their property.40
The court afﬁrmed the agency order but indicated that “should the waste plume
migrate to the subsurface of FPL Farming’s property and cause harm, FPL Farming
may seek damages from EPS.”41 This statement, which is dicta, suggests that the
court believed that the surface owners held title to the subsurface strata, as the
court’s statement does not say that the “surface” itself must be harmed for FPL to
have a cause of action.
In contrast to %MENY, the court in -APCO held that the mineral owner held
title to the subsurface storage space for natural gas.42 In -APCO, owners of certain
fractional mineral interests brought a partition action against the surface owner,
who also owned a fractional mineral interest and was storing gas underground.43
The storage reservoir was created by partially leaching salt from a salt dome.44 Salt
is recognized as a “mineral” in Texas.45 In awarding owelty damages, the court
reasoned as follows:
Texas adopted the view that interest in minerals, such as
oil, gas, salt and other minerals are susceptible of ownership in
place in the ground prior to production of the minerals at or
on the surface. The Texas rule is that this interest in minerals is
an interest in real property. Thus, the fee mineral owners retain
a property ownership, right and interest after the underground
storage facility—here, a cavern—had been created. These same
fee mineral owners are vested with ownership rights, including,
of course, entitlement to compensation for the use of the cavern. . . . Thus, Texas law would recognize the continuing property
ownership interest of the fee mineral estate owners in the cavern
....
39
FPL Farming, Ltd. v. Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm’n, No. 03-02-00477-CV, 2003
WL 247183 (Tex. App. 2003) NO WRIT. The court noted that it was “assuming without deciding”
that the surface owners had implicit “existing rights” in the deep subsurface beneath their land. Id.
at *3.
40

Id. at *1 n.3 (stating that the plaintiffs do not own the mineral interests associated with the
property).
41

Id. at *5 (citing TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 27.104 (West 2000)).

42

Mapco, Inc. v. Carter, 808 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. App. 1991), rev’d in part on other grounds, 817
S.W.2d 686 (Tex. 1991).
43

Id. at 264–65.

44

Id. at 274.

45

Id. (citing State v. Parker, 61 Tex. 265, 268 (1884)).
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....
. . . The Appellees [plaintiff mineral-interest owners] . . .
owned an undivided, but large majority, interest in the fee title
and fee estate to the minerals in place and, as such, they had a fee
title interest in the cavern after the minerals were extracted.46
Thus, the -APCO court, although ultimately reversing on other grounds,47
concluded that, because the mineral owner had title to the salt, the mineral owner
had title to the salt cavern and walls of the cavern.48
Query whether the court would have reached the same conclusion if the
storage reservoir had been created in a subsurface formation that did not contain
“minerals.” Arguably, -APCO applies only when storage space is created by partially
excavating a mineral-bearing strata and then using that strata’s excavated space
for storage. Surface owners may strongly argue that -APCO does not support
mineral-owner title in generic subsurface strata because the court emphasized
the fact that the mineral owner created the storage space by mining a mineral
deposit. The storage space was not a naturally occurring pore space, but rather an
excavated cavern, and the storage container was itself that same mineral that had
been partially extracted. Moreover, the mineral owner would presumably have the
right to use the cavern to extract the remainder of the salt.49
Concluding Thoughts: Notwithstanding -APCO, surface owners have the
stronger argument for ownership of pore spaces and hence subsurface CO2
sequestration rights that are not related to EOR. Nevertheless, mineral owners, as
holders of the dominant estate, have the right to explore for and produce oil, gas,
and minerals without unreasonable interference from the surface owner. When a
surface owner unreasonably interferes with the rights of the mineral owner, the
surface owner may be enjoined and liable for damages. In Ball v. Dillard, the Texas
Supreme Court stated that the rights of surface and mineral owners are “reciprocal
and distinct” and that “[n]either party can interfere with the rights of the other.”50
Therefore, a surface owner, by asserting a right of pore-space ownership and by
engaging in subsurface CO2 sequestration may not unreasonably interfere with
mineral exploration or exploitation. Furthermore, if the storage reservoir contains
naturally occurring and commercially recoverable hydrocarbons, then the mineral
owners may be deprived of their right to the native hydrocarbon gas in place. Thus,

46

-APCO, 808 S.W.2d at 274–75.

47

Mapco, Inc. v. Carter, 817 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. 1991).

48

-APCO, 808 S.W.2d at 274.

49

See Int’l Salt Co. v. Geostow, 878 F.2d 570 (2d. Cir. 1989) (construing New York law).

50

Ball v. Dillard, 602 S.W.2d 521, 523 (Tex. 1980) (citing Brown v. Lundall, 344 S.W.2d 863
(Tex. 1961)).
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regarding CO2 sequestration that is not related to EOR, obtaining permission
from both the surface and mineral owner is the cautious approach even though
I conclude that the storage rights are most likely held by the surface owner. On
the other hand, regarding oil and gas development, including CO2 injection for
EOR, only the mineral owner need give permission, such as by executing an oil
and gas lease.
If CO2 sequestration is a goal, whether in addition to, or independent of EOR,
then a robust regulatory system is needed to assure that the goal of sequestration
is actually achieved. Moreover, a robust regulatory permit process could lessen
the likelihood that dissenting surface or mineral owners could launch a successful
challenge to a CO2 sequestration project. If the legislature declares that CO2
sequestration is in the public interest, if an agency is charged with the duty to
regulate and authorize sequestration, if the agency holds a public hearing that
meets all due-process requirements, and if the agency issues a permit to inject CO2
into what the agency ﬁnds to be a well-deﬁned and conﬁning stratum after making
ﬁndings of fact that support the utility of the speciﬁc sequestration project, then
the likelihood of a successful challenge by dissenting surface or mineral owners
is remote.51 For example, although sequestration may make mineral exploitation
below the storage reservoir more expensive, such exploitation is still likely to be
possible;52 thus, a regulatory taking claim is not likely to succeed. Other grounds
for reversal of administrative orders can be avoided through the passage of
appropriate enabling legislation and through appropriate agency implementation
and processes.
Any regulatory regime should explicitly recognize that the recovery of
commercial minerals will generally have priority over the use of pore spaces for
CO2 sequestration so as not to interfere with the rights of mineral developers and
so as not to cause the underground waste of mineral resources. While priority
rules arising under the recordation acts, coupled with the “dominance” of the
mineral estate, might be theoretically used to achieve this end, given the prevailing
checkerboard pattern of land and mineral ownership, a regulatory regime that
gives primacy to commercial mineral development over CO2 sequestration would

51
For a glimpse of what a regulatory law might look like, see H.B. 0090, Enrolled Act No. 25,
59th Wyo. Leg. 2008 Budget Session (effective July 1, 2008). For analogous Texas regulatory law,
see TEX. NAT. RES. CODE §§ 91.201–91.207 (regulating underground hydrocarbon storage) and id.
§§ 91.171–91.184 (regulating underground natural gas storage).
52

In general, absent proof that the enjoyment of minerals is impossible, courts have not found
that a taking has occurred. See, e.g., City of Abilene v. Burk Royalty Co., 470 S.W.2d 643 (Tex.
1971) and Tarrant County Water Control & Improvement Dist. v. Haupt, Inc., 854 S.W.2d 909
(Tex. 1993).
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be a more practical and workable approach.53 In 3TORCK V #ITIES 3ERVICE 'AS #O.,
the Oklahoma Court of Appeals held that, despite contrary provisions in a gas
storage lease, the lessors and their mineral lessees had a statutory right to explore
for oil and gas in formations other than the one used for storage, subject to the
right of the storage lessee to monitor and approve drilling plans and subject to
Oklahoma Corporation Commission regulations.54 Wrongful interference by
the storage lessee could give rise to actual damages, such as damages caused by
drainage of oil to nearby lands, and possible punitive damages.55
Of course, the ultimate answer may be eminent domain—the common means
of acquiring gas storage rights in several states56 and under federal regulatory law.57
If a party seeking to sequester CO2 had the power of eminent domain, then no
“owner,” whether surface or mineral, would be able to prevent a sequestration
project. But the question remains: Who is entitled to compensation for the
taking? Currently, the safest answer is to compensate both surface and mineral
owners. However, I submit that, under the umbrella of a regulatory regime, a
reasonably safe answer would be to compensate surface owners on the theory
that they own the pore spaces and hence the sequestration rights. In particular
circumstances, mineral owners should be compensated where their ability to
exploit known commercial mineral reserves would be prevented by the CO2
sequestration project, although proving prevention may often be a burden that is
too hard to meet. However, if a party intended to inject CO2 into a gas reservoir
containing native gas that was being left in the reservoir as “cushion gas” to prevent
water encroachment into the pore spaces, the gas owner should be entitled to
compensation for that native gas if the owner can prove that the gas could have
been economically recovered.58 Moreover, a regulatory agency might ﬁnd that
producing the cushion gas would result in greater comparative waste if water
encroachment would ruin the reservoir for sequestration purposes.

53
For an example of a newly enacted regulatory regime, see 2008 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 30,
principally codiﬁed at WYO. STAT. ANN. § 30-11-313 (2008). For analogous law dealing with
mineral-development conﬂicts, such as a conﬂict between a coal developer and an oil and gas
developer, see N.D. CENT. CODE 38-15 (regulatory resolution of conﬂicts in subsurface mineral
production). For an informative article discussing mineral-development conﬂicts, see Phillip Wm.
Lear, -ULTIPLE -INERAL $EVELOPMENT #ONmICTS !N !RMAGEDDON IN 3IMULTANEOUS -INERAL /PERATIONS,
28 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST 79 (1983).
54

Storck v. Cities Serv. Gas Co., 575 P.2d 1364, 1368 (Okla. 1977), remanded to 634 P.2d
1319 (Okla. Civ. App. 1981) (citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 36.1).
55

3TORCK, 634 P.2d at 1322.

56

See TEXAS NAT. RES. CODE §§ 91.171–.184.

57

See 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c)(1)(A).

58

See, e.g., ANR Pipeline Co. v. 60 Acres of Land, 418 F. Supp.2d 933, 941–44 (W.D. Mich.
2006); see also Williston Basin Interstate Pipeline Co. v. An Exclusive Gas Storage Lease Hold in the
Judith River Subterranean Geological Formation, 999 F.2d 546 (9th Cir. 1993) (unpublished, but
memorandum opinion is available at 1993 WL 242979).
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Another reason favoring eminent domain is the prevalence of co-tenancy
title. Co-tenancy title would be of greatest concern if mineral owners held the
storage rights because severed mineral interests have become more and more
fractionalized.59 But whether the pore space is owned by co-tenant surface
owners or mineral owners and regardless of the nature of the sequestration
interest—whether deemed a lease, an easement, or an outright sale of the pore
space—each co-tenant must consent to the burdening or sale of her interest for
the sequestration interest to be fully effective.60 Similar consent problems arise
with successive interests.61
In conclusion, regarding the issue of pore-space ownership, consider the
following statement by Professors Smith and Weaver:
The issue ultimately turns on whether the implied easement
to use the surface and subsurface in any way reasonably necessary
for exploring, drilling, producing, transporting, and marketing
includes the right to store non-native gas. Unlike pressure
maintenance and cycling operations, underground injections for
storage purposes are not directly related to production. Indeed,
they are usually not even associated with initial marketing, but
with downstream activities more closely connected to ﬁnal retail
sales. From this perspective, it would seem that the right to store
gas produced from a stratum other than the one in question is
roughly analogous to the right to open a service station, a right
that belongs more properly to the surface estate than the mineral
estate.62
Thus, absent an EOR-related CO2 sequestration, this comment would seem to
support surface-owner title to the pore space and hence the right to sequester
CO2.

59
See, e.g., Ellis v. Ark. La. Gas Co., 450 F. Supp. 412, 422 (E.D. Okla. 1978) (observing that
if “it was the mineral interest owner and not the surface owner who had power to grant storage
rights, it would typically mean that hundreds of severed mineral interest owners would have to be
contacted if those rights were to be obtained privately”).
60

See, e.g., Elliott v. Elliott, 597 S.W.2d 795, 802 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980), NO WRIT.

61

See, e.g., Kemp v. Hughes, 557 S.W.2d 139 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977), NO WRIT. Plausibly, however,
by analogy to the prevailing law regarding mineral exploitation by less than all co-tenants, each
co-tenant may have the right to sequester carbon if they account to other co-tenants for any net proﬁts.
See Prairie Oil & Gas Co. v. Allen, 2 F.2d 566 (8th Cir. 1924). While this approach is theoretically
plausible, the notion that multiple co-tenants might engage in simultaneous sequestration operations
may not be practical. Moreover, while, under the prevailing view, individual co-tenants can exploit
minerals without being liable for waste, courts might not view carbon sequestration as analogous
to mineral exploitation.
62

SMITH & WEAVER, supra note 38, § 2.1.B.3.
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III. TRESPASS-RELATED ISSUES
The prior section considered pore-space ownership of the tract where the
CO2 sequestration operation directly occurs. This section deals with the thornier
question of neighboring tracts. Even if an injecting party holds the appropriate
rights regarding the tracts actually used for the sequestration operation, that
party may be liable for trespass or related torts if CO2, whether injected for
sequestration or EOR, migrates to neighboring tracts. Because CO2 sequestration
is closely analogous to EOR, wastewater storage, and natural gas storage, case law
involving these activities is helpful in assessing the risk of liability to neighboring
landowners.

! %NHANCED /IL 2ECOVERY )NJECTIONS AND &RACTURING !NALOGIES
With EOR, trespass issues arise when the injected substance, commonly
water, crosses ownership lines, invading neighboring property and perhaps even
displacing oil and gas reserves or making recovery of the reserves more difﬁcult
and more expensive. Trespass issues can also arise when fracturing operations
create fractures that extend beyond the operator’s unit. Once again, Texas case
law provides an indeﬁnite answer. Some cases recognize a cause of action for
subsurface trespass and other cases avoid any deﬁnitive rule on the issue.
As with title issues, regulatory bodies, such as the Railroad Commission,
have no general authority to authorize trespasses or other torts. However, two
cases suggest that regulatory orders may provide some protection. In #ORZELIUS V
2AILROAD #OMMISSION, the commission issued an order authorizing a party, as agent
of the commission, to drill a directional well to help extinguish a gas-well blowout
and ﬁre that was threatening the surrounding area.63 The party responsible for the
blowout sought to enjoin this operation on the ground that the agent’s well bore
would directly invade the party’s mineral estate.64 In this emergency, the court
concluded that the commission’s order shielded the driller from being enjoined.65
Although a trespass was not enjoined, this case offers little comfort to a party
wishing to sequester CO2 because it deals with an emergency situation.
A case providing more comfort is 2AILROAD #OMMISSION OF 4EXAS V -ANZIEL.66
The plaintiff landowners sought to set aside a commission order authorizing the
operator of an adjacent tract to drill an exception-location well close to their tract
to inject water for EOR.67 The exception well was authorized under the auspices

63

Corzelius v. Railroad Comm’n, 182 S.W.2d 412, 413–14 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944), NO WRIT.

64

Id. at 414.

65

Id. at 416–17.

66

Railroad Comm’n of Tex. v. Manziel, 361 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. 1962).

67

Id. at 561.
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of a commission-approved voluntary unitization plan.68 The landowners sought
to set aside the order on the ground that water injected at that location would
inevitably cross ownership lines, resulting in a trespass and the early watering out
of one of their oil wells.69
The court stated that it was presented with the issue of “whether a trespass
is committed when secondary recovery waters from an authorized secondary
recovery project cross lease lines.”70 After discussing the utility of EOR operations
the court stated:
We conclude that if, in the valid exercise of its authority
to prevent waste, protect correlative rights, or in the exercise of
other powers within its jurisdiction, the Commission authorizes
secondary recovery projects, a trespass does not occur when the
injected, secondary recovery forces move across lease lines, and
the operations are not subject to an injunction on that basis. The
technical rules of trespass have no place in the consideration of the
validity of the orders of the Commission.71
In reaching this conclusion, the court quoted Professors Howard Williams and
Charles Meyers:
What may be called a ‘negative rule of capture’ appears to be
developing. Just as under the rule of capture a landowner may
capture such oil or gas as will migrate from adjoining premises
to a well bottomed on his own land, so also may he inject into a
formation substances which may migrate through the structure
to the land of others, even if it thus results in the displacement
under such land of more valuable with less valuable substances
. . . .72
The result in this case would be more comforting if it had been brought
against the operator of the injection well, rather than brought as an action to set
aside an order of the Railroad Commission. While a consideration of trespass may
have “no place” in a proceeding to determine the validity of a commission order,
trespass would be pertinent in a private cause of action in tort. Indeed, the court
seemed to recognize this distinction, when it stated:

68

Id. at 566.

69

Id.

70

Id. at 567.

71

-ANZIEL, 361 S.W.2d at 568–69 (emphasis added).

Id. at 569 (quoting HOWARD WILLIAMS & CHARLES MEYERS: OIL
(1995)).
72
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[W]e are not confronted with the tort aspects of such practices.
Neither is the question raised as to whether the Commission’s
authorization of such operations throws a protective cloak around
the injecting operator who might otherwise be subjected to the
risks of liability for actual damages to the adjoining property
. . . .73
Nevertheless, the court did discuss trespass in some detail and was sympathetic
to the view that traditional rules of trespass may not be appropriate for subsurface
invasions that are for the greater public good—such as for EOR in this case and,
by analogy, perhaps for CO2 sequestration in a future case. The court’s discussion
suggests that a regulatory order, issued in the public interest, is necessary if
traditional trespass rules are to be avoided.74 However, this suggestion begs the
following question: If a regulatory order is entered, thereby avoiding traditional
trespass rules, what “nontraditional” trespass rules will apply? The issuance of

73

Id. at 566.

74

For voluntary unitization for enhanced recovery or for the conservation and use of gas, see
TEX. NAT. RES. CODE §§ 101.001–101.018. Under § 101.013:
(a) Agreements for pooled units and cooperative facilities are not legal or effective
until the commission ﬁnds, after application, notice, and hearing:
(1) that the agreement is necessary to accomplish the purposes speciﬁed
in Section 101.011 of this code;
(2) that it is in the interest of the public welfare as being reasonably
necessary to prevent waste and to promote the conservation of oil or gas
or both;
(3) that the rights of the owners of all the interests in the ﬁeld, whether
signers of the unit agreement or not, would be protected under its
operation;
(4) that the estimated additional cost, if any, of conducting the operation
will not exceed the value of additional oil and gas so recovered, by or on
behalf of the several persons affected, including royalty owners, owners of
overriding royalties, oil and gas payments, carried interests, lien claimants,
and others as well as the lessees;
(5) that other available or existing methods or facilities for secondary
recovery operations or for the conservation and utilization of gas in
the particular area or ﬁeld concerned or for both are inadequate for the
purposes; and
(6) that the area covered by the unit agreement contains only that part of
the ﬁeld that has reasonably been deﬁned by development, and that the
owners of interests in the oil and gas under each tract of land in the area
reasonably deﬁned by development are given an opportunity to enter into
the unit on the same yardstick basis as the owners of interests in the oil
and gas under the other tracts in the unit.
(b) A ﬁnding by the commission that the area described in the unit agreement is
insufﬁcient or covers more acreage than is necessary to accomplish the purposes of
this chapter is grounds for the disapproval of the agreement.
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an order, even one that includes a ﬁnding of fact that no harm will result to
neighboring properties, will not necessarily bar a private action in tort.75 Perhaps
injunctive relief would be denied, limiting a plaintiff to a recovery of proven
actual damages resulting from trespass, which could be a difﬁcult burden to meet.
Moreover, if a regulatory order is entered, then Texas courts would be unlikely to
award punitive damages.
Or perhaps traditional trespass rules would be more fully avoided in favor of
a nuisance analysis that would balance the utility of CO2 sequestration with the
gravity of the harm to the plaintiff landowner. This latter approach would treat
CO2 sequestration similarly to the treatment of atmospheric CO2 emissions—
albeit that emitting pollutants into the atmosphere to be carried by prevailing
winds through the airspace of neighboring tracts is distinguishable from the
intentional injection of pollutants for permanent storage beneath speciﬁc tracts.
As with trespass, if the sequestration were authorized by a regulatory commission,
then injunctive relief to abate a nuisance might be denied and punitive damages
might be barred.
In contrast to voluntary unitization for EOR, trespass issues posed by
hydraulic fracturing historically did not receive the same favorable treatment that
water injection received in -ANZIEL. In 'REGG V $ELHI 4AYLOR /IL #ORP, the Texas
Supreme Court held that courts, not the Railroad Commission, have primary
jurisdiction to determine whether a fracturing operation may result in a trespass
and whether relief is appropriate.76 Finding that cracks resulting from fracture
treatments crossing property lines are analogous to drill bits that cross property
lines, the court concluded that such an intentional and direct invasion could
constitute a subsurface trespass.77
In 'EO 6IKING )NC V 4EX ,EE /PERATING #O,78 however, the Texas Supreme
Court retreated from its pronouncements in 'REGG. In this case, an operator sued
a well-service company for improperly fracturing a well.79 In appealing a damages
award, the well-service company argued that the jury should have been instructed
to disregard the amount of production obtained from fractures extending beyond

75

See, e.g., Gregg v. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp., 344 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. 1961); compare Champlin
Exploration, Inc., v. R.R. Comm’n of Tex., 627 S.W.2d 250 (Tex. App. 1982), WRIT REFUSED NRE.
WITH Muckelroy v. Richardson Indep. Sch. Dist., 884 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. App. 1994), WRIT DENIED
(distinguishing Champlin).
76

Gregg v. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp., 344 S.W.2d 411, 415 (Tex. 1961).

77

Id. at 416–17.

78

Geo-Viking, Inc. v. Tex-Lee Operating Co., 1992 WL 80263 (Tex. 1992), OPINION WITHDRAWN,
839 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. 1992).
79
Geo-Viking, Inc. v. Tex-Lee Operating Co., 817 S.W.2d 357, 364 (Tex. App. 1991), WRIT
DENIED WITH PER CURIAM OPINION.
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the boundaries of the leased land.80 The court of appeals rejected this argument,81
citing the rule of capture, which protects drainage from beneath the land of
others.82 The Texas Supreme Court initially reversed, ﬁnding that fracturing
the subsurface of another’s land is trespass, precluding application of the rule of
capture.83 Subsequently, however, at the request of the parties, the Texas Supreme
Court withdrew its opinion and its writ of error, stating that the “application was
improvidently granted”84 and concluding that “we should not be understood as
approving or disapproving the opinions of the court of appeals analyzing the rule
of capture or trespass as they apply to hydraulic fracturing.”85 This ruling left
much confusion about whether fracturing that crosses property lines constitutes
trespass.
In -ISSION 2ESOURCES )NC V 'ARZA %NERGY 4RUST, the Court of Appeals for
the Thirteenth District held inter alia that Texas recognizes a cause of action for
trespass from subsurface fracture treatments that cross property boundaries.86 The
court rejected the contradictory holding by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
District in 'EO 6IKING,87 citing the Texas Supreme Court’s holding in 'REGG.88
On August 29, 2008, the Texas Supreme Court reversed this portion of the
case, holding that subsurface hydraulic fracturing was not an actionable trespass
because the drainage of hydrocarbons by this means was protected by the rule
of capture.89 Presumably, the injection of CO2 for enhanced recovery would be

80

Id. at 363–64.

81

Id. at 364.

82

See, e.g., Brown v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 83 S.W.2d 935, 940 (Tex. 1935).

83

'EO 6IKING )NC, 1992 WL 80263.

84

'EO 6IKING )NC, 839 S.W.2d at 798.

85

Id.

86

Mission Resources, Inc. v. Garza Energy Trust, 166 S.W.3d 301, 310 (Tex. App. 2005), pet.
granted.
87

'EO 6IKING )NC, 817 S.W.3d at 364–64.

88

-ISSION 2ES )NC, 166 S.W.3d at 311.

89

Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008) rehearing denied.
In People’s Gas Co. v. Tyner, 31 N.E. 59 (Ind. 1892), the Indiana Supreme Court held that the
analogous technique of shooting a well to prime recovery was protected by the rule of capture but
also subject to the law of nuisance where the shooting, which was done with nitroglycerin, posed a
danger to a densely populated area.
I have suggested that the rule of capture would be an appropriate means of resolving the analogous
trespass question when geophysical information is acquired from nearby lands through 3-D or
conventional seismic operations that occur on other lands. Owen L. Anderson & Dr. John D. Pigott,
$ 3EISMIC 4ECHNOLOGY )TS 5SES ,IMITS  ,EGAL 2AMIlCATIONS, 42 ROCKY MT MIN. L. INST. 16-1,
16-111–16-117 (1996). I have also suggested that the rule of capture should offer similar protection
from trespass in the case of hydraulic fracturing. Bruce M. Kramer & Owen L. Anderson, 4HE 2ULE
OF #APTURE!N /IL AND 'AS 0ERSPECTIVE, 35 ENVTL. L. 899, 933–36 (2005).
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similarly protected. Some of the reasons cited by the court for its decision would
also support protecting CO2 sequestration from trespass actions.
The court reasoned that trespass requires actual injury and that trespass injury
should not be inferred when the physical invasion occurs far below the surface.
The court noted that the ad coelum maxim “‘has no place in the modern world’”
and that “the law of trespass need no more be the same two miles below the
surface than two miles above.”90 The court also reasoned that it should not usurp
the lawful authority of the Texas Railroad Commission to decide to regulate, or
not regulate, fracturing, should not allow the litigation process to determine the
extent of harm (drainage) that is caused by fracturing, and should not allow an
actionable trespass (by changing the rule of capture) when the oil and gas industry
does not “want or need the change.”91 Justice Willett, concurring, would have gone
further and held that, not only was fracturing not an actionable trespass, it was
not a trespass at all.92 His concurring opinion discussed the necessity of hydraulic
fracturing for the recovery of hydrocarbons. As a matter of public policy, as with
hydraulic fracturing, Texas courts should ﬁnd that no trespass occurs if injected
CO2 crosses property lines. Because CO2 injection, unlike hydraulic fracturing,
will be subject to a regulatory permitting regime, the court should have even fewer
concerns about CO2 injection for enhanced recovery or CO2 sequestration.

" 'AS 3TORAGE !NALOGY
Natural gas is frequently injected into the subsurface for temporary storage.
Underground gas storage is closely analogous to CO2 sequestration, except that
CO2 sequestration is indeﬁnite, not temporary. Trespass issues arising in the gas
storage context offer insight about how Texas courts will likely analyze trespass in
the CO2 sequestration context. Of course, CO2 sequestration and gas storage are
factually distinct: gas storage is an ongoing operation, involving a continuous cycle
of injections and withdrawals of gas, while CO2 sequestration involves injection
for permanent storage. CO2 is essentially a waste product, while gas is a valuable
commodity. Moreover, at some point, a CO2 sequestration reservoir would reach
its maximum capacity, at which time ongoing CO2 injection would come to an
end, whereas active gas injections and withdrawals could continue indeﬁnitely.
These factual distinctions, however, do not seem signiﬁcant enough to justify
ignoring gas storage LAW, which does seem analogous.
In (AMMONDS V #ENTRAL +ENTUCKY .ATURAL 'AS #O, an early Kentucky case,
the court reasoned that natural gas injected for storage was really released back

90

#OASTAL /IL, 268 S.W.3d at 11 (quoting United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 260–61
(1946)).
91

Id. at 14–16.

92

Id. at 29 (Willett, J., concurring).
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to nature—in essence, abandoned.93 Because the gas was abandoned, the gas
had no owner.94 Comparing injected gas to captured wild animals returned to
nature, the court found that no trespass occurred when the released gas migrated
to neighboring property.95 However, the court further ruled that when the gas
was returned to nature, it became “subject to appropriation by the ﬁrst person” to
capture the gas.96
Texas rejected the reasoning of Hammonds, ﬁnding that injected natural gas
is not abandoned but remains the personal property of the injecting party and, as
such, is no longer subject to capture by neighboring landowners even if the gas
migrates beneath neighboring tracts.97 However, because the gas is not abandoned,
the question of trespass then arises. In ,ONE 3TAR 'AS #O V -URCHISON, the gas
storage company acquired the right to store natural gas in what was thought
to be a well-deﬁned subsurface reservoir.98 However, unknown to the storage
company, the reservoir was connected to other subsurface strata, allowing the
injected gas to migrate to neighboring subsurface property.99 Because the storage
company had title to the injected gas as personal property, the court held that
the storage company did not lose title to gas that migrated under neighboring
land.100 Neither -URCHISON nor any other Texas case squarely addresses the trespass
question—perhaps because of the difﬁculty of proving actual damages.
Trespass resulting from stored natural gas may be more easily tolerated
because its storage is temporary and because it is not a waste product. In contrast,
CO2 might be treated differently because CO2 is a waste product intended for
permanent storage. Nevertheless, if a neighboring landowner suffered actual
damages either from CO2 sequestration or from gas storage, a court would
probably award damages on grounds of trespass, nuisance, or negligence, but most
likely would not issue an injunction if the sequestration or injection were done
under the auspices of a regulatory permit. To avoid a potential damages claim,
the cautious approach would be to acquire sequestration or storage rights for
the entire reservoir. Moreover, acquiring rights to the entire reservoir, in the case
of gas, effectively prevents neighbors from producing stored gas under the guise
93

Hammonds v. Central Ky. Natural Gas Co., 75 S.W.2d 204, 205–06 (Ky. Ct. App. 1934).

94

Id.

95

Id. at 206.

96

Id. Hammonds has been greatly limited by Tex. Am. Energy Corp. v. Citizens Fid. Bank &
Trust Co., 736 S.W.2d 25 (Ky. 1987).
97

See Humble Oil & Ref. v. West, 508 S.W.2d 812, 817 (Tex. 1974); Lone Star Gas Co. v.
Murchison, 353 S.W.2d 870, 880 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962), NO WRIT (citing Chafﬁn v. Hall, 210 S.W.2d
191 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948), NO WRIT); see also White v. N.Y. State Natural Gas Corp., 190 F. Supp.
342 (W.D. Pa. 1960).
98

,ONE 3TAR 'AS #O., 353 S.W.2d at 871–72.

99

Id.

100

Id. at 880.
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of producing native gas, and, in the case of CO2, effectively prevents neighbors
from drilling into the reservoir in a manner that could result in the escape of
CO2. These risks, however, could be largely ameliorated by a robust regulatory
process.
Again, the ultimate answer may be eminent domain. In the case of gas
storage, gas utilities in Texas may acquire gas storage rights by eminent domain.101
In addition, the Natural Gas Act of 1938 allows underground gas storage rights
to be obtained by eminent domain.102 Similar legislation could authorize the
acquisition of CO2 sequestration rights. The Texas Underground Natural Gas
Storage and Conservation Act of 1977 provides that “the storer has the right to
condemn all of the underground storage area and any surface area required for the
use and enjoyment of the storage facility.”103 More speciﬁcally, the Act provides as
follows:
After an order of the commission is issued approving a storage
facility, a storer may condemn without further attack as to its
right to condemn, any subsurface sand, stratum, or formation
for the underground storage of natural gas, condemning all
mineral and royalty rights as are reasonably necessary for the
operation of the storage facility, subject to the limitations of this
subchapter, and the storer may condemn any other interests in
property that may be required, including interests in the surface
estate in the sand, stratum, or formation reasonably necessary to
the operation of the storage facility, provided that:
(1) no part of a reservoir is subject to condemnation unless
the storer has acquired by option, lease, conveyance, or other
negotiated means at least 66- 2/3 percent of the ownership of
minerals, including working interests, and 66- 2/3 percent of the

101

TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 91.171–.184 (2007). This act provides that:
All natural gas in the stratum condemned which is not native gas, and which is
subsequently injected into storage facilities is personal property and is the property of
the injector or its assigns, and in no event is the gas subject to the right of the owner
of the surface of the land or of any mineral or royalty owner’s interest under which
the storage facilities lie, or of any person other than the injector to produce, take,
reduce to possession, either by means of the law of capture or otherwise, waste, or
otherwise interfere with or exercise any control over a storage facility. Upon failure,
neglect, or refusal of the person to comply with this section, the storer has the right
to compel compliance by injunction or by other appropriate relief by application to
a court of competent jurisdiction.

Id. § 91.182 (emphasis added). Note that, by reason of the emphasized language, this statute does
not address the right to injected gas that migrates beyond the stratum condemned.
102

15 U.S.C. § 717f (2005).

103

TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 91.180 (2001).
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ownership of the royalty interests, computed in relation to the
surface area overlying the part of the reservoir which as found by
the commission to be expected to be penetrated by displaced or
injected gas;
(2) no dwelling, barn, store, or other building is subject to
condemnation; and
(3) the right of condemnation is without prejudice to the rights
of the owners or holders of other rights or interests of land to drill
through the storage facility under such terms and conditions as
the commission may prescribe . . . .104
Although the Act seems neutral on the issue of pore-space “ownership,” the
Act implies that both mineral and surface owners have rights in the storage strata.
Under the Act, the storing party is merely authorized, not required, to condemn
subsurface strata, including all mineral and royalty rights, as are reasonably
necessary for the operation of the storage facility. This provision allows the storing
party to protect its storage rights by condemning any rights to exploit the storage
strata and its contents; however, all rights to drill through the strata are expressly
preserved. Further, the storing party may condemn any rights in the surface estate
in the sand, stratum, or formation reasonably necessary to the operation of the
storage facility. If mineral owners owned the pore spaces, then there would be no
need to condemn surface interests because the storing party could acquire the
rights of reasonable use of the airspace, surface, and subsurface from the mineral
owner without the need to acquire any further rights from the surface owner.
As a whole the statute implies that the storing party may need to condemn the
surface rights respecting the land where injection, withdrawal, monitoring, and
transportation operations take place and condemn those mineral and royalty
interests that may be actually damaged by storage operations.

# 7ASTEWATER )NJECTION !NALOGY
Another activity closely analogous to CO2 sequestration is wastewater disposal.
Wastewater is often disposed of by injecting it into deep subsurface formations.105
Wastewater disposal is regulated by the Texas Commission on Environmental
Quality,106 and, in the case of waste disposal from oil and gas operations, by the
Texas Railroad Commission.107

104

Id. at § 91.179.

105

46 TEX. PRACTICE SERIES, ENVTL. LAW § 26.12 (2007).

106

TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 27.001–.024 (2008).

107
Id. §§ 27.031–.038. Section 37.038 provides: “The commission has jurisdiction over the
injection of carbon dioxide produced by a clean coal project, to the extent authorized by federal law,
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In &0, &ARMING ,TD V 4EXAS .ATURAL 2ESOURCES #ONSERVATION #OMMISSION,
an unreported case, the Court of Appeals for the Third District, discussed in
Section II, above, stated in dicta that a landowner who suffers encroachment of
wastewater may seek damage if the plaintiff suffers actual intrusion and actual
harm.108 The state regulatory agency granted permits to a disposal company for
injection wells to inject non-hazardous waste at depths between 7,350 to 8,200
feet below the surface.109 The agency required the applicant to project how far
and in what directions the waste may migrate over a 30-year period.110 When
neighboring surface owners discovered that the waste was projected to reach their
subsurface strata within 10 years of injection,111 they asserted that the agency was
authorizing an impairment of their subsurface rights.112
The court “assumed without deciding” that the surface owners had “‘existing
rights’ in the deep subsurface beneath their land,” but noted the legal trend that
“property owners do not have the right to exclude deep subsurface migration
of ﬂuids.”113 Dismissing the argument that “migration alone will impair [their]
existing rights,” the court held that “some measure of harm must accompany the
migration for there to be impairment.”114 “[B]ecause of [the agency’s] . . . expertise
in the geological effects of subsurface migration of injectates,” the court deferred
to the agency’s ﬁnding that, in this case, no existing rights would be impaired by
the injection.115 Nevertheless, at the end of its opinion, the court indicated that,
if the waste did migrate and cause some measure of harm, the surface owners
could seek damages from the injector.116 In general, migration and actual harm
have been difﬁcult to prove.117 Similarly, in the context of CO2 sequestration,
the difﬁculty in proving actual intrusion and actual damages is likely to impede

into a zone that is below the base of usable quality water and that is not productive of oil, gas, or
geothermal resources by a Class II injection well, or by a Class I injection well if required by federal
law.”
108
FPL Farming, Ltd. v. Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm’n, No. 03-02-00477-CV,
2003 WL 247183, *5 (Tex. App. 2003), NO WRIT.
109

Id. at *1.

110

Id.

111

Id.

112

Id. at *4.

113

Id. at *3 (citing United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 260–61 (1946); Raymond v. Union
Tex. Petroleum Corp., 697 F. Supp. 270, 274–75 (E.D. La. 1988); Chance v. BP Chems., Inc., 670
N.E.2d 985, 991–92 (Ohio 1996); Railroad Comm’n v. Manziel, 361 S.W.2d 560, 568–69 (Tex.
1962)).
114

&0, &ARMING ,TD, 2003 WL 247183 at *4.

115

Id.

116

Id. at *5.

117

See, e.g., Mongrue v. Monsanto Co., 249 F.3d 422, 433 (5th Cir. 2001); Chance, 670 N.E.2d
at 991–92.
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trespass actions by neighboring property owners. Though a surface owner may
prove ownership of the subsurface strata and perhaps an actual intrusion, proving
actual damage may be difﬁcult. In the end, as with conventional waste disposal,
public interest may weigh more heavily in favor of protecting CO2 sequestration
from speculative damage claims.
Concluding Thoughts: Regarding neighboring lands, I submit that permission
from neighboring landowners should not be necessary, although receiving
permission from the owners of all pore spaces invaded by CO2 would certainly be
the cautious approach.118 My view would be strengthened if Texas were to bolster
its CO2-injection regulatory law with a statute similar to the Texas voluntary
unitization law.119 Nevertheless, the weight of analogous Texas case law strongly
suggests that the courts will not entertain trespass actions arising from CO2
injection or sequestration in the absence of actual injury.

IV. APPLICATION OF LEGAL PRINCIPLES TO CO2 STORAGE
Because EOR, hydraulic fracturing, natural gas storage, and wastewater
disposal are all closely analogous to CO2 sequestration, Texas courts are likely
to issue opinions regarding CO2 sequestration that rely on existing case law
addressing these analogous activities. And because strong public-policy arguments
can be made in favor of initiatives that will reduce the human CO2 footprint,
Texas courts are likely to render opinions that will encourage the development of
a healthy and vibrant CO2 sequestration industry.
The question of whether the surface estate or mineral estate owns the
property interest in the pore space remains. Although the weight of law supports
surface-owner title, absent a robust regulatory program to assure and protect the
integrity of subsurface CO2 reservoirs, prudent CO2 injectors may also elect to
obtain permission from mineral owners. As indicated in the prior section, the
need for surface-owner permission should ordinarily be limited to permission
from the surface owner of the land where the injection operations are conducted.
As a practical matter, the need for mineral-owner permission regarding the lands
where the injection operations are conducted, and regarding the lands nearby,
depends on the likelihood of conﬂicting mineral operations and on the existence
of a robust regulatory system protecting the integrity of the CO2 reservoir, while
still allowing mineral development to occur in a manner that does not impair that
integrity.

118

See discussion in prior section. Of course, the operator of a carbon sequestration project
might face tort liability for negligent or wasteful operations to injured parties, whether or not such
parties gave permission for the operations. Cf. Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W.2d 558, 562–63
(Tex. 1948) (holding producer liable for negligent and wasteful drilling of a gas well).
119

See TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 101.001–.018 (2001).
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A recent adjudication by the Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”)
Environmental Appeals Board underscores why the storage permittee must gain
permission to store from the proper interest holder.120 The EPA administers the
Safe Drinking Water Act by issuing permits to inject wastewater and other wastes,
including CO2. The petitioners claimed that the EPA’s issuance of a permit to
store CO2 authorized a trespass onto the deep subsurface of their adjacent land.121
The regional EPA permitting authority stated, and the board afﬁrmed, that the
permitting program “does not have authority to determine surface, mineral, or
storage rights when issuing permit decisions. Issues relating to property ownership
or lessee rights are legal issues between the permittee and property owners.”122
Therefore, the authority may issue permits to the storing party without considering
ownership because the only factor that is relevant to the issuance of a permit is
whether drinking water may be contaminated. The permit confers no property
right and no right to trespass.123 Under these regulations, a wastewater storage
permit does not give the holder any property right to store CO2 underground and
does not preclude a cause of action for trespass.124 Accordingly, the storing party
must be careful to gain permission from the proper property owners—whether
the mineral owner, surface owner, or both. At this point, without an afﬁrmative
ownership declaration from the Texas courts, it is advisable to gain permission
from both—at least regarding the tract where the injection operations will take
place.
I have suggested that a robust regulatory process could, at least in some
cases, eliminate the need to seek permission from mineral owners where CO2 is
injected for sequestration independent of an EOR project and where there is little
likelihood of commercially recoverable oil and gas or where the sequestration
operation is unlikely to interfere with ongoing or future oil and gas operations.
This suggestion assumes that the surface owner owns the pore spaces. Absent
a robust regulatory process and absent clariﬁcation of the ownership question,
the words of Professor Eugene Kuntz, addressing gas storage, summarize the best
practice for CO2 sequestration:
Because the cases on the subject are few in number and
are not in harmony, when a subsurface stratum is acquired for
storage purposes, the grant should be taken from the person
having the rights to extract the particular substance to be stored,

120

Core Energy, LLC, E.P.A. Envtl. Appeals Bd. Permit No. MI-137-5X25-0001, UIC Appeal
No. 07-02 (Jan. 15, 2008).
121

Id.

122

Id.

123

Id.

124

Id.
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the surface owner and the owner of any other mineral rights.
Prudence also dictates that grants be secured from mineral
owners of any separate strata not acquired whose rights of access
might be impaired, from owners of various surface interests, and
from owners of easements or other similar interests whose rights
might be impaired in some way. It should be observed that an
ordinary oil and gas lease will not yield the measure of protection
required for subsurface storage of gas.125

APPENDIX 1
/WNERSHIP OF )NJECTED #/2 AND THE .ATURE OF A #/2 3EQUESTRATION 2IGHT
Brief comments are appropriate regarding ownership of injected CO2 and
the nature of a CO2 sequestration right. Again, legal analogies are helpful. In
Bingaman v. Corporation Commission, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the
operator of an EOR unit retained the right to recover gas injected in furtherance
of the unitization plan.126 That the injector or the injector’s contractor retains
continuing ownership of, and hence liability for, the injected CO2 may not be the
best policy if CO2 sequestration is to be encouraged.127
The more appropriate legal analogy may be to treat CO2 similarly to the
atmospheric emissions of CO2. Under this approach, the injector or its contractor
would be deemed to have intentionally abandoned the CO2 and hence be unable

125

1 EUGENE KUNTZ, OIL AND GAS § 2.6(c) (1987) (footnotes omitted).

126

Bingaman v. Corp. Comm’n, 421 P.2d 635, 638 (Okla. 1966).

127

In Texas, the legislature has enacted legislation providing that the Railroad Commission will
assume “ownership” of carbon sequestered under a clean coal FutureGen research project. TEX. NAT.
RES. CODE ANN. § 119.002 (2006). Upon commission acquisition of title:
the owner or operator of the clean coal project is relieved from liability for any act or
omission regarding the carbon dioxide injection location, and the method or means
of performing carbon dioxide injection, if the injection location and method or
means of injection comply with the terms of a license or permit issued by the state
and applicable state law and regulations.
TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 119.004 (2007). Similar Illinois legislation regarding a clean coal
FutureGen research project provides:
If the FutureGen Project locates at either the Tuscola or Mattoon site in the State
of Illinois, then the FutureGen Alliance agrees that the Operator shall transfer
and convey and the State of Illinois shall accept and receive, with no payment due
from the State of Illinois, all rights, title, and interest in and to and any liabilities
associated with the sequestered gas, including any current or future environmental
beneﬁts, marketing claims, tradable credits, emissions allocations or offsets
(voluntary or compliance based) associated therewith, upon such gas reaching the
status of post-injection, which shall be veriﬁed by the Agency or other designated
State of Illinois agency. The Operator shall retain all rights, title, and interest in and
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to assert continuing title to it. This approach would also suggest that a neighboring
landowner would have no trespass claim for CO2 migration, although a nuisance
claim would still be possible. However, this approach might also mean that the
injected CO2 would be available to the ﬁrst ﬁnder or appropriator who captured
it with the lawful permission of the landowner. Of course, recapture and any
assertion of ownership of sequestered CO2 by ﬁnders or any other interference
with sequestered CO2 could be fully addressed through a robust regulatory
system, which could include regulatory safeguards to assure that the CO2 would
remain sequestered or, if extracted for some use, would be properly re-sequestered.
Control, access to, and use of the strata containing CO2 could also be regulated to
assure that the CO2 remains sequestered. If necessary, eminent domain could be
used to further protect the integrity of CO2 reservoirs.
A combined abandonment, regulatory, and eminent domain approach is
preferable to an approach that would assume that the injector or the injector’s
contractor would continue to own injected CO2. In other words, if an injector
secured the necessary regulatory permits required under a robust regulatory regime
and, acting in good faith, without negligence, and relying on sound science and
technology, sequestered CO2 in a conﬁning stratum, the injector should not
be deemed to be the indeﬁnite owner of the CO2. Realizing that CO2 can be
deadly in concentrated form and acidic if not pure, a comprehensive regulatory
program must address how the escape of sequestered CO2 that endangers public
health should be addressed, both in terms of its containment and in terms of
compensating injured parties; however, that topic is beyond the scope of this
paper.
Under a well-devised regulatory approach, third parties, having a legal
right and legitimate need to penetrate the sequestered reservoir to gain access to
deeper natural resources, could have the right to do so if regulatory safeguards
were followed to prevent the escape of CO2. So long as these other parties are
not prevented from developing deeper resources, they should not have a takings
claim.

to and any liabilities associated with the pre-injection sequestered gas. The Illinois
State Geological Survey of the Illinois Department of Natural Resources shall
monitor, measure, and verify the permanent status of sequestered carbon dioxide
and co-sequestered gases in which the State has acquired the right, title, and interest
under this Section.
20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1107/20 (2008). Governor Dave Freudenthal of Wyoming has stated that the
federal government must address the long-term liability and indemniﬁcation issues regarding the
risk of a catastrophic release of sequestered CO2. Dave Freudenthal, #ARBON 3EQUESTRATION ,AWYERS
#ORNUCOPIA OR 0ANDORAS "OX, 31 WYOMING LAWYER 16, 18 (February 2008). For analogous federal
law limiting liability for atomic-energy projects, see 42 U.S.C. § 2012 et seq.
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The nature of the CO2 sequestration right could be classiﬁed as a license, a
lease, an easement,128 or an outright conveyance of the pore space.129 A 50-year gas
storage “lease” was classiﬁed as a lease of real property.130 The acquisition of a gas
storage right by condemnation has been classiﬁed as an easement, not the taking
of a fee.131 The classiﬁcation of a gas storage right as an easement can be signiﬁcant
in determining the compensation required in a condemnation proceeding. If
classiﬁed as an easement, damages in such an action might be measured by the
diminution in value of the burdened fee estate.132
The following discussion of 2EESE %XPLORATION )NC V 7ILLIAMS .ATURAL 'AS
Co.,133 taken from the supplement to the Kuntz treatise,134 offers insightful
comments regarding the nature of a gas storage right and the consequences of the
classiﬁcation:
In 2EESE, . . . the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, applying
Kansas law and based upon the granting clauses of oil and
gas leases that contained a gas storage provision, held that the
right to store gas is not limited to the formation initially used
for storage and that no part of the rights had been abandoned.
And based upon provisions of the lease assignments, the court
held that another party’s oil rights were expressly subject to
and inferior to the gas storage rights. The case involved a suit

128
When a gas storage right is acquired by eminent domain in Texas, statutory law provides
that, upon “abandonment” of the storage facility, the storing party must ﬁle in the county deed
records an instrument stating that “all property, both mineral and surface, . . . has reverted to those
who owned the property at the time of condemnation, or their heirs, successors, or assigns.” TEX.
NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 91.184 (2001). The reference to abandonment suggests that the interest
condemned may be an easement, but the reverter language suggests that the interest condemned
may be a fee simple determinable or a lease. However, another section suggests that the interest
may be voluntarily acquired by “option, lease, conveyance, or other negotiated means . . . .” Id.
§ 91.179.
129
In Pitsenberger v. N. Natural Gas Co. Inc. 198 F. Supp. 665, 677 (S.D. Iowa 1961), the
court rejected a challenge to underground gas storage agreements brought on the grounds that the
storage permit transaction licensed a permanent nuisance and was therefore unconscionable. See also
Keasler v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 569 F. Supp. 1180, 87–88 (E.D. Tex. 1983) (holding that such
transactions are not fraudulent); Storck v. Cities Serv. Gas Co., 575 P.2d 1364, 1369 (Okla. 1977)
(holding that such transactions are not fraudulent or against public policy).
130

3TORCK, 575 P.2d 1364, 1368 (Okla. 1977), remanded to 634 P.2d 1319 (Okla. Civ. App.

1981).
131
See Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co. v. Buckles, 182 N.E.2d 169, 176 (Ill. 1962). See also
Ozier v. Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 297 N.E.2d 21, 22 (Ill. App. 1973).
132

0EOPLES 'AS, 182 N.E.2d at 176.

133

Reese Exploration Inc. v. Williams Natural Gas Co., 983 F.2d 1514 (10th Cir. 1993).

134

1 EUGENE KUNTZ, supra note 125, § 3.6(c) (Supp. 2007).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol9/iss1/2

28

Anderson: Geologic CO2 Sequestration: Who Owns the Pore Space

WHO OWNS THE PORE SPACE?

2009

125

for negligence in permitting injected gas to migrate from an
underground gas storage zone into overlying oil sands that were
being waterﬂooded by the owner of the oil rights. The owner
of the oil rights charged that the owner of the gas storage rights
knowingly increased pressure in its storage formation even
though it knew that gas was escaping and hindering secondary
oil recovery efforts. The court stated that, while the oil-rights
owner owed an implied duty not to interfere with the superior
gas storage rights, the gas storage owner owed no corresponding
duty to the oil-rights owner. Although the court intimated that
the gas storage owner might be subject to an implied covenant
to reasonably and prudently conduct its storage operations, the
court declined to further address that question because Kansas
courts had not applied the reasonable and prudent operator
standard to gas storage operations and because the parties had
not raised the issue. . . . In reaching its decision, the court never
discussed the nature of a gas storage right. Is it like a landlord/
tenant lease? If so, then abandonment of part of a gas storage right
would not be recognized (e.g., if a tenant who leases a 10-story
building uses only the ﬁrst ﬂoor, the tenant will not be found to
have abandoned the other ﬂoors). Is the gas storage right similar
to an oil and gas lease—valid for so long as gas is stored? If so,
[partial or complete] abandonment would be possible if the lease
is classiﬁed as a proﬁt [but the element of intent to abandon is
often difﬁcult to prove]. Or is a gas storage right like a general
easement? Suppose that, under a general road easement, the
road is constructed so that it crosses only a small portion of the
burdened land. At that point, the corridor of the easement may
be deﬁned and limited. See generally 2 American Law of Property
§ 8.66 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952) and Columbia Gas Transmission
Corp. v. An Exclusive Natural Gas Storage Easement, 127
O&GR 346, 620 N.E.2d 48 (Ohio 1993) (describing a gas
storage right as an easement). Thus, if a gas storage right is
like an easement, the storage right might be conﬁned to the
formations historically used when the easement is ﬁrst put to
use. Perhaps analogies are inappropriate. Perhaps a gas storage
right is sui generis. If so, then it should not be compared to
other interests, including the oil and gas lease—even though the
storage right itself is included in such a lease. Thus, the court’s
reference to oil and gas lease implied covenants does not seem
helpful or appropriate. Indeed, if the gas storage owner owed
no duty regarding negligence, it is difﬁcult to see how it would
have owed a duty based upon an implied covenant. However,
one analogy to an oil and gas lease that does seem appropriate
is the right of the lessee to make reasonable use of the surface
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subject to the modern accommodation doctrine. In other words,
perhaps the gas storage right should have been construed in light
of a duty to accommodate multiple uses of the property. Under
an accommodation approach, the test would be whether the
gas storage owner could reasonably accommodate the efforts
by the owner of the oil rights to recover additional oil through
waterﬂooding. This case points out that conﬂicts among various
subsurface users (e.g., coal miners, oil producers, and gas storage
users) may not be best resolved by a formalistic application of
property interest priority rules originally established without
contemplation of this kind of conﬂict. Perhaps they would be
better resolved administratively in a manner that encourages
multiple land use, promotes the greatest possible economic
recovery of natural resources, prevents waste, protects correlative
rights, and encourages accommodation.135

APPENDIX 2
3ELECTED 3URVEY OF /THER *URISDICTIONS 2EGARDING 0ORE 3PACE /WNERSHIP
Colorado
Colorado has no case law that expressly addresses pore-space ownership;
however, one could argue that 'RYNBERG V #ITY OF .ORTHGLENN136 supports mineralowner title to pore spaces. In this case, the City, desirous of installing a wastewater
reservoir, was required by statute to determine whether the land was suitable for a
wastewater reservoir.137 The City obtained permission from the surface owner to
obtain core samples and such samples were publicly ﬁled with the state ofﬁcials.
Grynberg, an unrecorded lessee of the coal rights, which were held by the State of
Colorado, sued for damages to the speculative value of his coal rights. In deciding
in favor of Grynberg, the court held that Grynberg, as the coal lessee, had the
exclusive right to grant permission to collect core samples from the coal seams.
While this case did not hold that Grynberg owned the pore spaces in the coal,
such an argument is likely to be made in a case that does involve pore-space
ownership. In any event, the 'RYNBERG decision seems wrong. A surface owner
desirous of intense surface development should have the right to take core samples
to determine whether the land is suitable for the intended development. The

1 EUGENE KUNTZ, supra note 125, § 2.6(c) (Supp. 2007) (citing Phillip Lear -ULTIPLE
-INERAL $EVELOPMENT #ONmICTS !N !RMAGEDDON IN 3IMULTANEOUS -INERAL /PERATIONS, 28 ROCKY
MTN. MIN. L. INST. 79 (1982); N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 38-15, § 2.6(c) (2007)).
135

136

Grynberg v. City of Northglenn, 739 P.2d 230 (Colo. 1987).

137

COL. REV. STAT. § 37-87-117 (1986 Supp.).
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mineral owner should not be allowed to hold the taking of core samples for
ransom, which is the practical effect of the decision.138
In "OARD OF #OUNTY #OMMRS V 0ARK #OUNTY 3PORTMENS 2ANCH ,,0, the
Colorado Supreme Court held that the storage of water in an aquifer does not
constitute a trespass against neighboring landowners where there was no physical
invasion of neighboring lands by directional drilling or occupancy by recharge
structures or extraction wells.139 In addition, the court concluded that such use of
an aquifer would not require the use of eminent domain or the payment of just
compensation.140

Kansas
Kansas has not directly addressed the issue of ownership of storage rights;
however, where an oil and gas lease expressly grants storage rights, such rights are
considered severable from the right to produce oil and gas.141 In other words, a
lessee having storage rights can separately assign such rights to a third party.
In the gas storage context, if gas stored by a private party—as opposed to a
public utility having the power of eminent domain142—migrates to a neighboring
tract, no trespass occurs, but the neighboring landowner is free to produce and
claim the gas.143 Since the landowner is permitted to produce the migrating gas,
thus actually beneﬁtting from the gas migration, the landowner suffers no actual
damage.
In #RAWFORD V (RABE, a case dealing with trespass of water injected for EOR
purposes, the Kansas Supreme Court found no actionable trespass. The facts of
the case involved a lessee who used wastewater brought onto the leased premises

138
After remand and further appeal, Grynberg received no damages. Grynberg v. Northglenn,
829 P.2d 473 (Colo. App. 1991).
139

Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Park County Sportsmen’s Ranch, LLP, 45 P.3d 693, 710 (Colo.

2002).
140

Id. at 715.

141

Rook v. James E. Russell Petroleum, Inc., 679 P.2d 158, 166–67 (Kan. 1984).

142

Parties having the power of eminent domain may protect their rights by securing a state
certiﬁcate and by condemning the reservoir, and such parties are further protected from the rule
of capture if they can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that injected gas had migrated to
adjoining property or to a stratum that has not been condemned. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 55-1210 (2007).
See Williams Natural Gas Co. v. Supra Energy, Inc., 931 P.2d 7 (Kan. 1997); Union Gas Sys., Inc.
v. Carnahan, 774 P.2d 962 (Kan. 1989). For the meaning of “adjoining,” see N. Natural Gas Co. v.
Nash Oil & Gas, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10181 (D. Kan. May 16, 2005) (unreported). If gas
migrates into another stratum, further condemnation may be pursued, but landowners’ damages for
the pre-condemnation trespass and unjust enrichment are measured by the fair rental value of such
stratum. Beck v. N. Natural Gas Co., 170 F.3d 1018 (10th Cir. 1999).
143

Anderson v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 699 P.2d 1023, 1031 (Kan. 1985).
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from elsewhere to enhance production on the plaintiffs’ land.144 The plaintiffs
claimed their interests had been injured by the migration of this water throughout
the premises.145 The court surveyed other jurisdictions’ treatments of subsurface
trespass of wastewater, ﬁnding that the orthodox rules applied to surface trespasses
do not usually apply to subsurface trespass and that, when water is injected to
increase production on the lessor’s land, no actionable trespass occurs.146 The
court also found that secondary recovery by injecting wastewater was practical
and an efﬁcient use of a potentially hazardous waste product. The court held that
plaintiffs had no cause of action for trespass.147
However, in 4IDEWATER /IL #O V *ACKSON, plaintiff proved actual damages, and
the court held the injector of wastewater for EOR liable when the water ﬂooded
the plaintiff ’s oil wells. The court reasoned:
[T]hough a water ﬂood project in Kansas be carried on under
color of public law, as a legalized nuisance or trespass, the water
ﬂooder may not conduct operations in a manner to cause
substantial injury to the property of a non-assenting lesseeproducer in the common reservoir, without incurring the risk of
liability therefor.148
To establish liability, “[i]t is sufﬁcient that the water ﬂooding activities were
intentional and the consequences foreseeable. They were actionable, even
though lawfully carried on, if they caused substantial injury to the claimants.”149
Nevertheless, because the activity was lawful under a conservation agency order,
the court reversed an award of punitive damages.150
The Kansas Supreme Court has rendered three decisions concerning
personal injury and property damage arising when stored gas migrated from the
underground reservoir and eventually vented at a surface location in downtown
Hutchinson, Kansas. The leak culminated in a massive explosion of natural gas
in the heart of the city, killing several people and destroying several businesses.151

144

Crawford v. Hrabe, 44 P.3d 442, 444 (Kan. 2002).

145

Id. at 447.

146

Id. at 448–50 (citing Holt v. Sw. Antioch Sand Unit, Fifth Enlarged, 292 P.2d 998 (Okla.
1955)); -ANZIEL, 361 S.W.2d at 568; 'EO 6IKING )NC, 817 S.W.3d at 357.
147

#RAWFORD, 44 P.3d at 452–53.

148

Tidewater Oil Co. v. Jackson, 320 F.2d 157, 163 (10th Cir. 1963).

149

Id. at 164.

150

Id. at 165.

151

Hayes Sight & Sound, Inc. v. ONEOK, Inc., 136 P.3d 428, 433–34 (Kan. 2006).
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The ﬁrst opinion dealt with an award of negligence and punitive damages for loss
suffered by a particular business. The last two opinions dealt with unsuccessful
class-action suits.152

+ENTUCKY
Two Kentucky cases suggest that the mineral owner may have the right to
control the use of potential petroleum-bearing sands.153 In #ENTRAL +ENTUCKY
.ATURAL 'AS #O V 3MALLWOOD, the court, citing what it believed to be the English
rule and without deciding ownership of the pore space, found that the mineral
owner had a continuing right to use strata to produce either naturally occurring
or stored gas.154 Thus, the mineral owner controlled the right to use the strata for
that purpose. This case must be read in light of (AMMONDS V #ENTRAL +ENTUCKY
.ATURAL 'AS #O, where the court held that injected natural gas was returned to
nature and thus once again subject to the rule of capture.155 Given the reasoning
of Hammonds and the migratory nature of gas, the mineral owner would logically
own the right to produce the migrated injected gas, but that does not mean that
the mineral owner would own the injection right, which, under Hammonds, is
of questionable value, given that the injected gas was deemed abandoned and
subject to the rule of capture. However, in 3MALLWOOD V #ENTRAL +ENTUCKY .ATURAL
'AS #O., as between the mineral owner and oil and gas lessee, the lessee was not
allowed to extend a lease beyond its primary term through injection operations
where the secondary term of the lease habendum clause required production.156
Some of the abandonment and rule-of-capture reasoning of Hammonds and
both 3MALLWOOD cases was overruled in 4EXAS !MERICAN %NERGY #ORP V #ITIZENS
&IDELITY "ANK  4RUST #O:
It is therefore the opinion of this court that, in those instances
when previously extracted oil and gas is subsequently stored in
underground reservoirs capable of being deﬁned with certainty
and the integrity of said reservoirs is capable of being maintained,

152

Gilley v. Kan. Gas Serv. Co., 169 P.3d 1064 (Kan. 2007); Smith v. Kan. Gas Serv. Co., 169
P.3d 1052 (Kan. 2007).
153
See Gray-Mellon Oil Co. v. Fairchild, 292 S.W. 743, 745–46 (Ky. 1927). But see Rice Bros.
Mineral Corp. v. Talbott, 717 S.W.2d 515, 516 (Ky. 1986) (oil and gas “ownership is limited to
possessing an exclusive legal right to explore and, if oil and gas is found, to reduce that substance to
possession and ownership”).
154

Cent. Ky. Natural Gas Co. v. Smallwood, 252 S.W.2d 866, 868 (Ky. 1952).

155

Hammonds v. Cent. Ky. Natural Gas Co., 75 S.W.2d 204, 205–06 (Ky. 1934).

156

Smallwood v. Cent. Ky. Natural Gas Co., 308 S.W.2d 439, 442–43 (Ky. 1958).
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title to such oil and gas is not lost and said minerals do not
become subject to the rights of owners of surface above the
storage ﬁelds.157
Arguably, the court rejected little of the reasoning in Hammonds. First, ownership
of any gas that was released back to nature and that migrated to nearby lands
would presumably lie with the mineral owner, not the surface owner; however,
that does not mean that the mineral owner owns the pore space. Second, if the
language about maintaining integrity means that the injector controls all rights
of access to the gas throughout the full extent of the reservoir—the facts in Texas
American—then little of Hammonds has been overruled as a practical matter
because, in Hammonds, the injector did not have full control.

,OUISIANA
In 5NITED 3TATES V  !CRES OF ,AND, a federal eminent domain case
construing Louisiana law, the court stated, “[w]hether a state is governed by an
‘ownership’ or a ‘non-ownership’ theory of mineral rights, the mineral owner
cannot be considered to have ownership of the subsurface strata containing the
spaces where the minerals are found.”158 By holding that the surface owner, rather
than the mineral owner, was entitled to compensation, the court effectively held
that the surface owner has the right to authorize subsurface storage. In -ISSISSIPPI
2IVER 4RANSMISSION #ORP V 4ABOR, the court also held that the surface owner owns
the storage rights, but the court recognized that the “mineral servitude owner . . .
enjoys the ‘right to participate in the production of the remaining natural gas and
condensate in the reservoir’ . . . and must be compensated for the expropriation
of this right.”159 However, in a federal condemnation case arising in Montana,
compensation for native gas was denied where the native gas could be produced
only because of increased pressure caused by the stored gas.160
The issue of subsurface trespass in Louisiana is less deﬁnitive. In 2AYMOND
V 5NION 4EXAS 0ETROLEUM #ORP, the plaintiffs claimed saltwater injected under
adjacent lands had migrated to their subsurface property.161 The court held that,
157

Tex. Am. Energy Corp. v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust, 736 S.W.2d 25, 28 (Ky. 1987).

158

U.S. v. 43.42 Acres of Land, 520 F. Supp. 1042, 1043, 1046 (W.D. La. 1981).

159

Miss. River Transmission Corp. v. Tabor, 757 F.2d 662, 672 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing S.
Natural Gas Co. v. Poland, 406 So.2d 657, 666 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981, writ denied)). Accord B&J
Oil & Gas v. FERC., 353 F.3d 71 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (addressing the right of the pipeline operator to
expand natural gas storage reservoir into area of active oil and gas production). State law determines
the parties entitled to compensation. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. Exclusive Natural Gas
Storage Easement, 962 F.2d 1192 (6th Cir. 1992).
160
Williston Basin Interstate Pipeline Co. v. An Exclusive Gas Storage Lease Hold in the
Judith River Subterranean Geological Formation, 999 F.2d 546 (9th Cir. 1993) (unpublished, but
memorandum opinion is available at 1993 WL 242979).
161

Raymond v. Union Tx. Petroleum Corp., 697 F. Supp. 270, 271 (E.D. La. 1988).
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because the state regulatory agency had issued a permit for the saltwater injection,
“it is not unlawful and does not constitute a legally actionable trespass.”162 In
dicta, however, the court noted that a permit does not preclude recovery for
actual damages and for inconvenience.163 Later, in -ONGRUE V -ONSANTO, the Fifth
Circuit afﬁrmed the decision of the federal district court in Louisiana, ﬁnding that
migrating wastewater did not cause the injecting party to be liable for a taking
without just compensation.164 The plaintiffs also asserted at the district court level
that the injector had committed subsurface trespass, although this issue was not
raised on appeal.165 Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit stated that if wastewater had
migrated across property lines, “appellants may recover under a state unlawful
trespass claim . . . regardless of the permit allowing for injection.”166 The Fifth
Circuit afﬁrmed 2AYMOND in another case, reasoning that migration of injected
wastewater is not “unlawful” if a valid regulatory permit authorizes the action.167

-ICHIGAN
Michigan law supports the surface owner’s title to subsurface pore space. In
$EPARTMENT OF 4RANSPORTATION V 'OIKE, the state acquired the surface estate of a
tract of land to improve a highway, leaving the former fee-simple owner with only
the mineral estate.168 The issue before the court was to determine who owned the
right to store non-native gas in the subsurface pore space.169 The court held that
“the storage space, once it has been evacuated of the minerals and gas, belongs to
the surface owner.”170
In !.2 0IPELINE #O V  !CRES OF ,AND, the court, in dicta, stated that “if
injected gas moves across boundaries there may be a trespass.”171 However, the
court held that the migration of non-native gas to neighboring property does not
give rise to a claim of inverse condemnation.172

162

Id. at 274.

163

Id.

164

Mongrue v. Monsanto, 249 F.3d 422 (5th Cir. 2001).

165

Mongrue v. Monsanto, No. CIV.A. 98-2531, 1999 WL 970354 (E.D. La. 1999), aff ’d, 249
F.3d 422 (5th Cir. 2001).
166

Id. at 432 n. 15.

167

Boudreaux v. Jefferson Island Storage & Hub, LLC, 255 F.3d 271, 274 (5th Cir. 2001).

168

Dep’t. of Transp. v. Goike, 560 N.W.2d 365, 365 (Mich. App. 1996).

169

Id.

170

Id.

171

ANR Pipeline v. 60 Acres of Land, 418 F. Supp. 2d 933, 940 (W.D. Mich. 2006).

172

Id. at 941.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2009

35

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 9 [2009], No. 1, Art. 2

132

WYOMING LAW REVIEW

Vol. 9

.EW -EXICO
In Hartman v. Texaco Inc., the court held that an oil and gas operator
who suffered actual damages from subsurface ﬂooding caused by neighboring
waterﬂooding operations has a cause of action for trespass, but the statutory right
of double damages does not apply to a subsurface trespass.173 In an earlier case, the
New Mexico Supreme Court afﬁrmed a decision of the conservation agency that
found that a salt-water disposal operation would not result in salt-water migration
to a nearby tract.174 However, the court stated in dicta:
The State of New Mexico may be said to have licensed the
injection of saltwater into the disposal well; however, such
license does not authorize trespass. The issuance of a license by
the State does not authorize trespass or other tortious conduct
by the licensee, nor does such license immunize the licensee
from liability for negligence or nuisance which ﬂows from the
licensed activity. . . . In the event that an actual trespass occurs
by Mobil in its injection operation, neither the Commission’s
decision, the district court’s decision, nor this opinion would in
any way prevent Snyder Ranches from seeking redress for such
trespass.175

.EW 9ORK
In )NTERNATIONAL 3ALT #O V 'EOSTOW, the court construed a conveyance of
“mines” of salt to mean that the grantee held fee title to the salt and not to the
excavation cavity.176 Nevertheless, the grantee retained exclusive right to use
the cavity so long as salt was not exhausted and mining operations were not
abandoned.177 The case did not involve storage or disposal activities. Rather,
the case involved the salt miner’s right to continue to use the mined caverns to
transport salt from parts of the mine that were beneath other lands. In -ILES V
(OME 'AS #O.,178 the court held that right to store foreign gas belonged to the
surface owner. Together, these two cases suggest that the surface owner has title to
pore spaces, but the mineral owner has a right to use stratum for ongoing mineral
operations.

173
Hartman v. Texaco Inc., 937 P.2d 979 (N.M. App. 1997) (construing N. MEX. STAT.
§ 30-14-1.1).
174

Snyder Ranches, Inc. v. Oil Conservation Comm’n, 798 P.2d 587 (N.M. 1990).

175

Id. at 590.

176

Int’l Salt Co. v. Geostow, 878 F.2d 570, 574 (2d. Cir. 1989) (construing New York law).

177

Id. at 575.

178

Miles v. Home Gas Co., 316 N.Y.Supp.2d 908 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1970).
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/HIO
In #HANCE V "0 #HEMICALS )NC, the plaintiffs brought a class-action suit
against BP Chemicals, claiming inter alia that the company had trespassed on their
subsurface property rights by injecting waste ﬂuids through injection wells and
that the ﬂuids had migrated across their property lines.179 Relying on the holding
from Willoughby Hills v. Corrigan,180 the court found that “ownership rights in
today’s world are not as clear-cut as they were before the advent of airplanes and
injection wells.”181 Though surface owners may claim to own the land from the
heavens to the depths and retain all not deeded in the severance of a mineral
estate, limitations exist on their rights to the subsurface.182
Just as a property owner must accept some limitations on the
ownership rights extending above the surface of the property, we
ﬁnd that there are also limitations on property owners’ subsurface
rights. We therefore extend the reasoning of Willoughby Hills,
that absolute ownership of air rights is a doctrine which “has
no place in the modern world,” to apply as well to ownership of
subsurface rights.183
Therefore, the court found the appellants’ subsurface rights to exclude others
extend only to invasions that “actually interfere with the appellants’ reasonable
and foreseeable use of the subsurface.”184
From the rule that subsurface rights extend only to the owner’s “reasonable
and foreseeable use,” the court did recognize the operator’s potential liability for
subsurface trespass if injected waste interfered with “reasonable and foreseeable use”
of the subsurface, not mere title or possession.185 In other words, the pore-space
owner must suffer actual damages. Though the plaintiffs’ claims were deemed
too speculative, the court noted that one class member might have a valid claim
because the subsurface migration of BP Chemicals’ waste forced that plaintiff to
abandon drilling plans.186 Accordingly, a mineral owner may have a valid trespass

179

Chance v. BP Chemicals, Inc., 670 N.E.2d 985 (Ohio 1996).

180

Willoughby Hills v. Corrigan, 278 N.E.2d 658, 664 (Ohio 1972) (citing United States v.
Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 260–261 (1946)) (“[T]he doctrine of the common law, that the ownership
of land extends to the periphery of the universe . . . has no place in the modern world.”).
181

Chance, 670 N.E.2d at 992.

182

Id.

183

Id.

184

Id.

185

Id. (emphasis added).

186

Chance, 670 N.E.2d at 993.
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claim in Ohio against a party who injects waste on neighboring lands if that waste
migrates across property lines and unreasonably interferes with access to oil and
gas.

/KLAHOMA
In Oklahoma, subsurface pore space belongs to the surface owner. In Sunray
/IL #O V #ORTEZ, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held the surface owner had the
right to grant permission to inject wastewater into the subsurface, as long as there
was no interference with the mineral estate’s recovery of oil and gas.187 Relying on
this holding and applying Oklahoma law, a federal district court, in %LLIS V !RKANSAS
,OUISIANA 'AS #O,188 held that a storage company must obtain permission from
the surface owner to store natural gas produced off the leased premises. The court
found that the mineral deed allowed the grantee the right to produce oil, gas, and
other minerals; therefore, the subsurface strata itself was retained by the surface
estate.189 Furthermore, the court noted the public policy interest in such storage,
stating that if “it was the mineral interest owner and not the surface owner who
had the power to grant storage rights, it would typically mean that hundreds of
severed mineral interest owners would have to be contacted if those rights were
to be obtained privately.”190 Thus, the surface owner owns the rights for both
wastewater injection and gas storage.
In /KLAHOMA .ATURAL 'AS #O V -AHAN  2OWSEY )NC., the court implicitly
concluded that the injector retains title to injected gas that migrated to other
lands.191 However, evidence showed that the gas was conﬁned to an identiﬁable
and well-deﬁned formation and that the gas was distinguishable, due to helium
content and lack of certain organic compounds, from native gas in the area.
Under Oklahoma statutory law, a public utility may acquire underground gas
storage rights by condemnation.192 Under this statutory law, injected gas remains
the property of the injector, even if the gas migrates beneath other lands, provided
that the injector can prove migration and also that the injector compensates the
owner of the invaded stratum.193
Oklahoma recognizes a cause of action for private nuisance when injected
water injures another’s interest in a well or leasehold, even when the water is
187

Sunray Oil Co. v. Cortez Oil Co., 112 P.2d 792 (Okla. 1941).

188

Ellis v. Ark. La. Gas Co., 450 F. Supp. 412, 421 (E.D. Okla. 1978), aff ’d, 609 F.2d 436,
439 (10th Cir. 1979).
189

Id.

190

Id. at 422.

191

Ok. Natural Gas Co. v. Mahan & Rowsey, Inc., 786 F.2d 1004, 1007–07 (10th Cir.

1986).
192

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 36.1–36.7 (1951).

193

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 36.6.
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injected for EOR purposes194 and even if injection is authorized by the Oklahoma
Corporation Commission.195 However, the requirement of showing actual injury
or recoverable damages remains. Therefore, if the waste is injected into a stratum
where oil, gas, or other minerals are unrecoverable, the likelihood of showing
damages decreases. In 7EST %DMOND 3ALT 7ATER $ISPOSAL !SSN V 2OSECRANS, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court found the owner of an adjacent tract had no cause of
action for trespass where the defendant injected saltwater into a stratum already
containing saltwater because the owner had suffered no actual damages.196 The
court found underground disposal to be the most practical solution for dealing
with wastewater and reasoned “[i]f such disposal of salt water is forbidden unless
oil producers ﬁrst obtain the consent of all persons under whose lands it may
migrate or percolate, underground disposal would be practically prohibited.”197
Nevertheless, Oklahoma recognized a cause of action when damages can be
proved. In 7EST %DMOND (UNTON ,IME 5NIT V ,ILLARD, saltwater injected into a
formation migrated onto adjacent land and interfered with the plaintiff ’s oil and
gas operations.198

0ENNSYLVANIA
In United States Steel Corp. v. Hoge, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that
methane embedded in a coal seam belonged to the owner of the coal seam.199 Some
of the court’s reasoning indicates that the court regarded the coal owner as owning
the coal stratum: “[A]s a general rule, subterranean gas is owned by whoever has
title to the property in which the gas is resting.”200 “When a landowner conveys
a portion of his property, in this instance coal, to another, it cannot thereafter be
said that the property conveyed remains as part of the former’s land, since title
to the severed property rests solely in the grantee.”201 “The landowner, of course,
has title to the property surrounding the coal, and owns such of the coalbed
gas as migrates into the surrounding property.”202 Nevertheless, “the coal owner’s
interest in that situs [is] in the nature of an estate determinable, which reverts to
the surface landowner by operation of law at some time subsequent to the removal
of the coal.”203 Since the case concerned ownership of gas, it does not directly
194
Greyhound Leasing & Fin. Corp. v. Joiner City Unit, 444 F.2d 439 (10th Cir. 1971); Boyce
v. Dundee Healdton Sand Unit, 560 P.2d 234 (Okla. Civ. App. 1975).
195

'REYHOUND, 444 F.2d at 444–45; Boyce, 560 P.2d at 234.

196

W. Edmond Salt Water Disposal Ass’n v. Rosecrans, 226 P.2d 965, 970 (Okla. 1950).

197

Id. at 969.

198

W. Edmond Hunton Lime Unit v. Lillard, 265 P.2d 730, 731 (Okla. 1954).

199

U.S. Steel Corp. v. Hoge, 468 A.2d 1380, 1383 (Pa. 1983) (Flaherty, J., dissenting).

200

Id. at 1383 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).

201

Id. (Flaherty, J., dissenting).

202

Id. (Flaherty, J., dissenting).

203

Id. at 1384 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
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address ownership of pore spaces. Would the coal owner’s property interest allow
him to inject CO2 into coal for permanent sequestration, which, as a practical
matter, would convert his fee simple determinable into a fee-simple absolute?

West Virginia
In 4ATE V 5NITED 3TATES &UEL 'AS #O, the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals held the surface owner had title to the subsurface space for natural gas
storage, based on the language in the particular severance deed at issue.204 The
deed severed from the grant a mineral estate in “[t]he oil, gas, and brine and all
minerals, except coal underlying the surface of the land.”205 The deed further
provided that “minerals” includes “clay, sand, stone, or other minerals [that] may
be necessary for the operation for the oil, gas and other minerals reserved and
excepted” in the deed.206 The court ruled that the owner of the surface estate held
title to the subsurface, including any clay, sand, and stone, subject to the right of
the mineral owner to use these substances as necessary to facilitate oil, gas, and
mining operations.207 As long as there were no recoverable minerals in the stratum
at issue, the surface owner could grant storage rights in the subsurface without
unreasonably encumbering the mineral owner’s recovery of their property.208 In
this case, the atypical reservation was an important part of the court’s analysis.

Wyoming
Wyoming has no case law addressing the ownership of pore spaces; however,
Wyoming is of special interest because it has enacted legislation that declares that
pore spaces are owned by the surface owner for purposes of CO2 sequestration.209
A separate act, addressing the regulation of CO2 sequestration,210 is based upon
the Model Statute drafted by the Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission
Task Force on Carbon Capture and Geologic Storage.211

204

Tate v. United States Fuel Gas Co., 71 S.E.2d 65, 71–72 (W. Va. 1952).

205

Id. at 67–68.

206

Id. at 68.

207

Id. at 72.

208

Id.

209

2008 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 29, principally codiﬁed at WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-1-152 (2008).

210

2008 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 30, principally codiﬁed at WYO. STAT. ANN. § 30-11-313

(2008).
211
INTERSTATE OIL AND GAS COMPACT COMM’N TASK FORCE ON CARBON CAPTURE AND GEOLOGIC
STORAGE, STORAGE OF CARBON DIOXIDE IN GEOLOGIC STRUCTURES, A LEGAL AND REGULATORY GUIDE
FOR STATES AND PROVINCES, APPENDIX I: MODEL STATUTE FOR GEOLOGIC STORAGE OF CARBON DIOXIDE
31–35 (2007). The Task Force has also drafted model regulations. Id. at APPENDIX II: MODEL
GENERAL RULES AND REGULATIONS at 36–47, available at http://www.crossroads.odl.state.ok.us/
cdm4/item_viewer.php?CISOROOT=/stgovpub&CISOPTR =3726&CISOBOX=1&REC=1.
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Because no Wyoming case law has addressed pore-space ownership, the
legislature’s declaration of pore-space ownership should be persuasive of
Wyoming law, although the Wyoming Supreme Court will likely have the last
word regarding nonfederal and non-Indian lands. Neither Wyoming case law nor
statutory law would determine whether federally-owned or Indian-owned mineral
rights—encompassing millions of acres in Wyoming—includes ownership of
pore spaces. Although no federal case law addresses pore-space ownership, limited
reservations of minerals, such as the reservation of coal, is not likely to reserve
pore spaces in the federal government.212
On the other hand, a broad reservation of minerals, such as the one under the
Stock-Raising and Homestead Act of 1916 (“SRHA”),213 might arguably reserve
pore spaces because of the very broad interpretation given to such reservations by
the federal courts.214 Nevertheless, I believe that the SRHA provision requiring
the reservation of “coal and other minerals” in patents, no matter how broadly
deﬁned by the federal courts, should not be construed as reserving pore spaces. In
Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc., the court, in a ﬁve to four ruling, held that gravel was
a “mineral.”215 Writing for the majority, Justice Marshall stated: “we interpret the
mineral reservation in the Act to include substances that are mineral in character
. . . , that can be removed from the soil, that can be used for commercial purposes,
and that there is no reason to suppose were intended to be included in the surface
estate.”216 This statement emphasized the extraction of substances that are mineral
in character.
Nevertheless, some language in the opinion might leave open the possibility
for the federal government to claim pore spaces. For example, Justice Marshall
concludes:
Finally, the conclusion that gravel is a mineral reserved to the
United States in lands patented under the SRHA is buttressed
212

Cf. Amoco Prod. Co. v. So. Ute Indian Tribe, 526 U.S. 865 (1999) (holding that the
reservation of coal in patents issued under the Coal Lands Acts of 1909 and 1910 did not include
methane gas embedded in coal).
213

43 U.S.C. § 299 (West 1993).

214

Cf. Watt v. W. Nuclear, Inc., 462 U.S. 36 (1983) (holding, on a vote of ﬁve to four, that the
reservation of “coal and other minerals” in a patent issued under the Stock-Raising and Homestead
Act of 1916 reserved gravel); United States v. Union Oil Co., 549 F.2d 1271 (9th Cir. 1977)
(holding that the reservation of “coal and other minerals” in a patent issued under the Stock-Raising
and Homestead Act of 1916 reserved geothermal resources on the ground that legislative history
revealed that Congress intended to reserve all mineral fuel resources). But see BedRoc Ltd. LLC
v. United States, 541 U.S. 176 (2004) (holding that the reservation of “coal and other valuable
minerals” in a patent issued under the Pittman Underground Water Act of 1919 did not reserve
sand and gravel); United States v. Hess, 194 F.3d 1164 (10th Cir. 1999) (vacating a ruling that the
reservation of “all oil and gas, coal and other minerals” in a land exchange reserved gravel).
215

Watt, 462 U.S. at 55.

216

Id. at 53.
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by “the established rule that land grants are construed favorably
to the Government, that nothing passes except what is conveyed
in clear language, and that if there are doubts they are resolved
for the Government, not against it.” [citations omitted] . . .
In the present case this principle applies with particular force,
because the legislative history of the SRHA reveals Congress’
understanding that the mineral reservation would “limit the
operation of this bill strictly to the surface of the lands.”217
Although this statement of legislative intent is broad enough to encompass federal
ownership of subsurface pore spaces, the Congressional focus of the Act was on
reserving minerals, not pore spaces. Thus, I would argue that the SRHA does not
vest ownership of pore spaces in the federal government.

217
Id. at 59–60, citing legislative history in H.R.Rep. No. 35, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1916)
(emphasis in original). United States v. Union Oil Co., 549 F.2d 1271 (9th Cir. 1977) contains
similarly broad language: “All of the elements of a geothermal system—magma, porous rock strata,
even water itself—may be classiﬁed as “minerals.” Id. at 1273–74. Note, however, that even this
Ninth Circuit opinion is silent about the pore spaces, and the thrust of the opinion regarded
geothermal resources as a mineral because of its energy potential. In Rosette Inc. v. United States,
277 F.3d 1222, 1227–29 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that geothermal resources were minerals under
the SRHA), the court summarized the holding in Watt as follows:

. . . [T]o qualify as a ‘mineral’ under the reservation of the SRHA a substance must
be 1) mineral in character, i.e. inorganic, 2) removable from the soil, 3) usable for
commercial purposes, 4) and of such a character that there was no reason to suppose
Congress intended it to be included in the surface estate.
....
The question is not what Congress intended to reserve, but rather what Congress
intended to give away in its grant to the landholder in the SRHA. The established
rule is that land grants are construed favorably to the government and nothing
passes except that which is conveyed in clear language, resolving all doubts in favor
of the government.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol9/iss1/2

42

